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How does the distribution of power within the household affect the nutrition of its 
members? In 1998, the largest social program in rural Mexico (PROGRESA) designed a 
random experiment for the purpose of evaluation. Exploiting the experimental nature of 
the data, I estimate calorie demand equations based on the predictions from different 
models of household behavior. There are three main findings in the first chapter. First, I 
reject the income pooling restriction and the Pareto-efficiency assumption for the 
nutrition decisions of families assuming that only the head of household and his spouse 
participate in decision-making. Second, I reject the income pooling restriction in the 
context of the extended family, for which all income earners contribute to decision-
making. Third, I show that changing the wife’s non-labor income has little effect on the 
levels of food consumption in households with two decision-makers. In the extended 
family setting, I find that, for a given level of household income, an increase in the 
number of income earners is associated with a decrease in calorie consumption. Yet, 
when a female household member starts earning income, family calorie consumption 
  
increases. When it is a male household member who starts earning income, family calorie 
consumption decreases.  
In the second chapter, we investigate heterogeneity in program impact for the 
Mexican social program PROGRESA, which is a means-tested conditional cash transfer 
program implemented in rural regions of the country. The “common effect” model in 
program evaluation assumes that all treated individuals have the same impact from a 
program. Does the program have the same effect on everyone? Will some groups benefit 
more from the program than others? The design of PROGRESA provides a theoretical 
motivation for exploring heterogeneity in program impacts. We examine the program 
targeting mechanism and find heterogeneity in the eligible population along the criteria 
used for beneficiary selection. We also investigate the overall heterogeneity of program 
impacts, which includes both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Experimental data 
are sufficient to identify mean program impacts or impacts on subgroups, but do not 
identify unobserved heterogeneity in impacts. Using a non-parametric technique, we find 
evidence against the “common effect” model. This result does not rely on any assumption 
and thus is particularly strong evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects. Additional 
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Chapter 1: Nutrition and income: Evidence from an experiment in 
a developing country 
1.1 Introduction 
Many of the social programs currently in place in Latin America intentionally 
direct monetary transfers at the female head of the household (usually the mother). This 
design reflects the belief that mothers care more about family well-being than fathers do. 
Directing transfers to women also implicitly questions unitary preference household 
models. According to these models, it should not matter who in the household receives 
the transfer, since optimal choices for the allocation of resources are made subject to a 
pooled budget constraint. The income pooling restriction provides a testable implication 
of the unitary model. 
There is substantial evidence against the unitary model (e.g. Thomas 1990 and 
Schultz 1990 in the context of developing countries; Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori 
and Lechène 1993, Fortin and Lacroix 1997 and Phipps and Burton 1998 for developed 
countries). However, empirical evidence on the effect of the distribution of income on 
household decisions may suffer from issues of endogeneity, measurement error and the 
lack of support in the data for the joint distribution of incomes. Studies that exploit an 
exogenous change in the intrahousehold distribution of income to identify the effect of 
the distribution of income (e.g. Lundberg, Pollak and Wales 1997; Attanasio and Lechène 
2002, Duflo 2003) constitute convincing pieces of evidence.  
The collective model of the household (Chiappori 1988, Browning and Chiappori 




household should not be treated as a single unit. The distribution of power within the 
household influences allocations. The main assumption of this model is that the collective 
allocation of resources is Pareto-efficient. The model imposes testable restrictions on the 
way in which distribution factors can enter demand equations. 
Much of the evidence on whether households attain Pareto-efficient outcomes is 
drawn from developed countries (e.g. France, Canada), where indeed households are 
found to make Pareto-efficient consumption decisions. However, using data from sub-
Saharan Africa on agricultural production decisions for plots operated by men and 
women living in the same household, Udry (1996) rejects the Pareto-efficiency 
assumption underlying the collective models. 
How does the distribution of power within the household affect the nutrition of its 
members? The purpose of this study is to test the income pooling restriction and the 
Pareto-efficiency assumption on the nutrition decisions of poor rural Mexican 
households. Both restrictions are tested for households assuming that only husbands and 
wives participate in decision-making. In addition, the income pooling restriction is tested 
in the context of the extended family, where any other household member who earns 
income contributes to decision-making.  
I rely on data collected for the evaluation of the Mexican program for education, 
health and nutrition, PROGRESA. The PROGRESA program is a means-tested social 
program that sends cash transfers to rural households upon compliance with a defined set 
of requirements. A distinctive feature of the design of the evaluation of PROGRESA is 




evaluation period.1 The sample consists of randomly selected treatment and control 
villages. The control group, which is denied transfers, is found to be similar to the treated 
group on all other aspects (Behrman and Todd 1999).2  
My paper contributes to the existing literature in four ways. First, I apply the 
models of household behavior to the nutrition decisions. There are two reasons for 
focusing on nutrition decisions. First, food expenditures represent 75 percent of the 
household budget of these poor rural households. I consider a food calorie aggregate that 
better captures the nutritional status of households than food expenditures in rural regions 
where consumption out of own production is important.3 Second, the higher the level of 
aggregation for the goods consumed, the more likely households will be found to attain 
Pareto-efficient outcomes. For example, households may be efficiently allocating 
resources towards the aggregate outcomes for nutrition, clothing and education but this 
could hide an inefficient allocation of resources within each of these categories. 
Second, I correct for the endogeneity issues between spouses’ incomes and 
calories by getting additional identifying restrictions for the spouses' incomes from a 
specific module of the survey that collects characteristics of the spouses’ families at the 
time of marriage. Along with the treatment dummy variable from the experiment, this set 
                                                 
1 A random assignment of potential beneficiaries in treatment and control groups was conducted in order to 
evaluate the actual impacts of the program on a range of outcomes. These impacts are assessed using 
estimators commonly used in program evaluation (e.g. difference-in-difference estimator). Detailed data 
description and mean impact results are presented in a series of research reports (see 
http://www.ifpri.org/themes/progresa.htm ). 
2 Behrman and Todd (1999) do find significant differences in the baseline at the individual and household 
levels. They argue that the differences appear to be statistically significant because of the large sample size. 
I include household-level and individual-level variables in the conditioning set to control for these 
differences. Recalling that the randomization is done at the locality level and not the individual or 
household level, this finding does not indicate a failure in the randomization process. Randomization of a 
social program at the individual or household level is usually found to be more disruptive than 
randomization at the locality level. 
3 As an example, as many as half of the households report consuming but not purchasing tortillas, a staple 




of instruments is likely to lead to precise estimates of the effect of the distribution factors 
on the demand for calories because of the strong correlation between the instruments and 
the endogenous variables. It is possible that most studies fail to reject Pareto-efficiency 
because the effects of the distribution factors are imprecisely estimated.  
Third, I test the unitary model of decision-making in the context of the extended 
family. For a given level of household income, changes in the number of income earners 
should not lead to changes in per capita calorie consumption if the unitary model holds. 
In this part, longitudinal data over three rounds are used. 
Fourth, I present evidence on the extent to which inappropriately neglecting the 
distribution of power within the household affects inferences about the demand for 
nutrition. In response to the emerging literature on intrahousehold allocation and 
bargaining power, Rosenzweig (1986) pointed out that the collective models “have not 
provided clear directions as to how intrahousehold allocation will differ when some 
individual attains more bargaining strength” (p.236). I examine how changes in the 
distribution of income impact the levels of calories consumed in the household.  
There are three main findings to this study. First, I reject the income pooling 
restriction and the Pareto-efficiency assumption for the nutrition decisions for families 
when only the head of household and his spouse are assumed to participate in decision-
making. Second, I reject the unitary model in the context of extended family decision-
making. Third, I show that changing the wife’s income has little effect on the levels of 
food consumption in households with two decision-makers. In the extended households, I 
find that calorie consumption increases when a woman starts earning income and 




The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, I describe the 
PROGRESA program, the experimental evaluation sample and the sample used in this 
study. In the third section, I model the household nutrition decisions using the collective 
framework. In the fourth section, I present the empirical models, the tests of income 
pooling and the test of Pareto-efficiency for the allocation decisions with respect to 
nutrition. In the fifth section, I review the empirical issues and present the estimation 
strategy adopted. In the sixth part, I discuss the estimation results. In the last section, I 
conclude. 
1.2 The Data 
1.2.1 Description of the PROGRESA program 
I rely on data collected for the evaluation of the Mexican program for education, 
health and nutrition, PROGRESA. The PROGRESA program targets poor rural 
households in Mexico. It has been implemented since 1998. At the end of 1999, it 
covered 2.6 million families, i.e., about 40% of all rural households and one ninth of all 
families in Mexico. In 1999, the program’s annual budget was approximately $777 
million, which corresponds to 0.2 percent of Mexico’s GDP (Skoufias, 2001). In January 
2002 the Inter-American Development Bank approved its largest loan ever to Mexico for 
expanding PROGRESA to urban areas of the country. Despite the recent important 
political changes, PROGRESA has been maintained under the new name Opportunidad.  
A baseline census of households provides the information used to determine the 
eligibility status of the households. Basically, a poverty line is drawn and only 




average, 78 percent of each locality’s population are found to be poor, that is, eligible for 
the program benefits. 
The program benefits are comprised of two components:  
1. Educational grants given to families with children in the last three years of 
primary school and secondary school children. The grant amounts vary by grade and 
gender, with greater awards to girls and to the most advanced children. The grants are 
given upon attendance to school. A complex system of verification based on forms 
completed and signed by teachers and school directors ensures that the attendance 
requirement is met before sending money to the households. 
2. All eligible households can benefit from a monetary transfer designed to 
help them improve their nutrition. They are encouraged to spend the money on food 
although not required to do so. In order to receive this cash transfer, they are required 
to make regular visits to health centers and to participate in health talks. Only one 
visit per year to a health center is required for adults, two to five visits a year for 
pregnant and breast-feeding women and two to seven visits a year for infants and 
children. In addition, nutritional in-kind supplements are provided to under-nourished 
children and infants and pregnant and breast-feeding women. 
An important characteristic of the PROGRESA program with respect to this study 
is that transfers are made to the mother in the household. Two additional features are that 
(1) transfers to a household cannot go beyond a given maximum transfer amount 
regardless of the number of eligible school-age children, (2) transfers are sent to the 
beneficiaries every two months after checking their compliance with program 




about 197 pesos per household per month, which is equivalent to 20% of the mean value 
of consumption of a poor household. 4 
1.2.2 Experimental design for the evaluation of PROGRESA 
The evaluation study is designed as an experiment with localities randomly 
assigned to treatment and control groups. Only eligible households in treatment localities 
receive benefits after the start of the program in mid-1998. During the evaluation period, 
benefits are denied to eligible households in the control group localities. Non-eligible 
households in the treatment and control localities do not receive benefits. The sample 
includes 506 localities (320 assigned to the treatment group and 186 to the control 
group). 
The evaluation dataset consists of repeated observations for about 24,000 
households over 5 rounds of survey (baseline: October 1997 and March 1998; follow-
ups: November 1998, June 1999 and November 1999). Data are collected to capture the 
multiple objectives of the program in terms of human capital investment and poverty 
alleviation. The last three surveys collect both household-level expenditure and 
individual-level labor activities and non-labor income (Table 1.1).5 They also include 
individual-level information on schooling, migration and health status, and locality-level 
information on the availability of services and prices. In addition, a module was specially 
designed to get information on the status of women and on intrahousehold relations.6 I 
also use administrative data on the actual PROGRESA transfers received by beneficiary 
households in the treatment group in 1998, prior to the November 1998 survey. 
                                                 
4 The figures are in November 1998 pesos and the value is approximately $20 U.S. 
5 All tables of chapter 1 are in the Appendix 1. 




1.2.3 Sampling frame 
In this paper, I use two datasets: (i) the November 1998 cross-section focuses on 
households with two decision-makers, and (ii) longitudinal data from November 1998, 
June 1999 and November 1999 allows me to study decision-making in extended families. 
The two decision-makers setting relies on the assumption that, even when 
household members other than the head of household and his spouse earn income, the 
sole two decision-makers are the head and his spouse.7 This is a strong assumption, 
which is relaxed in the extended family setting. The extended family setting allows every 
household member who earns income to participate in decision-making.  
The November 1998 survey is collected for 24,073 households (136,250 
individuals). I select 20,925 households for which there is an intact couple. I restrict the 
sample to 17,382 households with a male head of household and his wife who are more 
than 15 years old and who report some income (labor earnings or non-labor income) and 
consumption data.  
In the end of 1998, a new computation of the poverty line led to the inclusion in 
the eligible population of 899 households who were previously ineligible for program 
benefits. This process is referred to as the “densification” process. It affected all eligible 
localities enrolled in the PROGRESA program. I exclude these households from the 
analysis because they have not yet received the program benefits at the time of the 
November 1998 survey although they probably anticipate becoming eligible.  
                                                 
7 Note that another way of defining two decision-maker families is to restrict the sample to households 
where only the husband and/or the wife earn income. Yet, this means restricting the sample based on a 
variable that may be affected by the PROGRESA treatment, namely having an additional earner in the 
family. Indeed, when comparing the fraction of the treatment and control groups that are dropped when 
applying this restriction to the sample, I find that respectively 34% of the control group households and 




The partition between the treatment and the control group and the eligible and 
non-eligible groups for the remaining 16,483 households is given in Table 1.2. I restrict 
the sample further to the 9,223 eligible households.8 This restriction is justified by the 
identification strategy used in the empirical section. Table 1.3 presents descriptive 
statistics for the variables in the selected sample. 
Longitudinal data from November 1998, June 1999 and November 1999 are used 
to study decision-making for extended families. In all three rounds, data are collected on 
household nutrition, consumption, labor activities and income. In contrast to the 1998 
cross-section sample, I keep all households for which consumption data are reported, 
including eligible and non-eligible households. There are a total of 18,790 households in 
each round. Changes in the number of individuals earning income are shown in Table 
1.4. Table 1.5 shows other descriptive statistics for this dataset. 
1.2.4 Expenditures, Nutrients and Incomes 
Food expenditures include household level data on food outlays made in the seven 
days preceding the interview for 36 food items. The value of food consumed from own 
production in that same period of time is added to food outlays to obtain the value of food 
consumption. Food consumed from own production is valued by imputing either a 
household-level price or a locality level price when the household does not report any 
expenditures on the food consumed from own-production. Non-food expenditures are 
expenses reported on a weekly, monthly and semi-annual basis. Non-food expenses 
                                                                                                                                                 
Instead, I impose the assumption that only the head of household and his spouse participate in decision-
making. 
8 Because some variables have missing data, the sample sizes used in the estimation are sometimes smaller 





reported on a weekly basis include transportation and tobacco. Monthly outlays include 
school tuition, health-related expenses, home cleaning, electricity and home fuel 
expenditures. Expenditures reported on a semi-annual basis include home and school 
supplies, clothes, shoes, toys and payments for special events. The value of consumption 
is computed as the sum of non-food expenditures and the value of food consumption.  
The measure of food calories consumed is constructed from the 7-day recall food 
consumption data. First, the number of units of the 36 food items bought and consumed 
in the household are converted into kilograms. The second step is to calculate for each 
food item the “edible” kilograms of food. The edible kilograms are converted into 
kilocalories.9 Lastly, instead of dividing this total household calorie consumption by the 
number of household members, an adjustment is made for the fact that some household 
members ate outside the home and some non-household members ate in the home during 
the study period. This adjustment consists in subtracting from household size the number 
of people having food outside and adding the number of people eating in the household. 
Thus, the aggregate food calories are represented by the daily per mouth measure of food 
calories consumed. I also consider aggregate calories consumed from four different food 
groups, i.e. calories from vegetables and fruits, calories from grains and cereals, calories 
from meat and meat products and calories from other food. 
The income data are comprised of labor and non-labor incomes. Labor income is 
constructed using wages and the value of employer-provided benefits from all activities. 
Most of the individuals work as agricultural workers paid on a daily basis. The second 
                                                 
9 All conversions are based on Mexican food tables from Tablas de Valor Nutritivo de los alimentos de mayor 




most common type of occupation for heads of household is self-employment.10 
Respondents are probed several times in the questionnaire to elicit all labor earnings. In 
particular, a section of the survey directly concerns more informal types of activities such 
as sewing and craft-making, cooking and home-cleaning, building, repairs and driving. 
Non-labor income is comprised of pensions, bank interest, rents and other revenues, 
government transfers and remittances. I also include the actual PROGRESA transfers in 
the wife's non-labor income for beneficiary households in the treatment communities. 
The average monthly transfer actually received by the women is about 125 pesos (in 1998 
figures). This figure is about three times less than the payment women are entitled to and 
which is computed using the program rules and household composition. Much of the 
difference between actual and hypothetical payments comes from operational problems in 
transfer delivery (Coady and Djebbari, 1999).  
In the extended family analysis, any individual who earns some labor or non-labor 
income is considered as an income earner. The number of income earners changes when 
household members enter or exit the labor force, start or stop receiving non-labor income. 
The number of earners also changes when one income earner joins the household or 
leaves the household. This variation occurs at the same time as the variation in household 
size. In the estimations, I control for the change in the number of household members. 
                                                 
10 Elsewhere in the questionnaire, detailed information on agricultural activities is collected. However, net profits 
computed as the difference between sales of agricultural products and expenses on inputs are negative for most of the 
respondents, which is not plausible. In addition, it is far from straightforward how to assign the agricultural profits to 





1.3 Applying the models of household behavior to household nutrition 
1.3.1 The unitary model of the household 
Suppose households derive utility U not from nutrition N directly, but from the 
effect of nutrition on health H. The production of health is also assumed to be affected by 
household characteristics θh (e.g. innate health status, access to a sewage system and to 
electricity) and locality characteristics θl (e.g. access to health facilities). Nutrition itself 
depends on the consumption of food Xk. In addition, the choice of the diet determines the 
absorption of nutrients. Thus, nutrition N also depends on household-specific 
characteristics µh that include the education of each spouse. Suppose that the household 
consumes K different food items with price pk along with a composite good Z (pz = 1) 
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The demands for food are functions of prices, total household income and 
household and locality characteristics as given in equation (1): 
(1)       for 1,..., : ( , , , , ).k k h l hk K X X p Y θ θ µ= =  
The unitary model embodies an important assumption with regards to household 
preferences. A household is assumed to behave “as one”. This occurs if all household 
members have the same preferences or if one household member imposes his 
preferences, acting as a dictator. The only economic justification for the unitary model is 




(Bergstrom, 1989). A testable implication of the unitary model is that, once you condition 
on household expenditures, individual incomes should not have any effect on demand. 
Consider the previous model assuming that only the husband and the wife participate in 
household decision-making. Let WNLY be wife’s non-labor income. Testing the unitary 
model restriction consists in testing that WNLY has no effect on the demand for food Xk, 
after controlling for all other factors affecting Xk.11 Thus, testing income pooling is based 
on the null hypothesis defined below: 






Alternatively, if data on husband's earnings HLY are also available, testing the 
unitary model can be based on the following joint hypothesis: 
( , , , , ) ( , , , , ): :   0.k h l h k h l hX p Y X p Yk
WNLY HLY




Similar tests have been proposed in the literature for different X outcomes. The 
most common outcomes include a system of budget shares for different categories of 
goods12 and health status of children.13  
                                                 
11 I use woman non-labor income instead of woman total income because only 5 percent of the women in 
the sample earn any labor income. In contrast, more men earn labor income than non-labor income. 
12 Thomas (1993) finds a differential effect of individual incomes on budget shares for urban Brazil. 
Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappori and Lechène (1993) find similar evidence from French data using 
individual incomes and total household income. Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) using data from Cote-
d’Ivoire show that the wife’s share of income significantly affects budget shares. Doss (1996) finds that 
household budget shares in Ghana depend on the share of current assets held by women. Browning and 
Chiappori (1998) reject the unitary model of the household with Canadian data on budget shares and 
individual incomes. Attanasio and Lechène (2002) find that the wife’s share of income significantly affects 
the budget shares with the same sample of Mexican households I use in this study. 
13 Thomas (1990) finds a differential effect of individual incomes on anthropometric measures for children 
and children’s survival probabilities in urban Brazil. Haddad and Hoddinott (1994) find an effect of the 
wife’s share of income on anthropometrics of Ivorian children. Thomas (1994) presents evidence for urban 
Brazil, urban Ghana and the US of an effect of parents’ education on child health. Thomas, Contreras and 
Frankenberg (2002) provide evidence of a differential effect of assets brought at time of marriage by the 
father and the mother on child health. Duflo (2003) finds that the presence of an elderly woman eligible for 
an old-age pension plan is associated with a large impact on the health of girls residing in the same 




Individual total incomes, non-labor incomes and labor earnings, current assets and 
assets at the time of marriage for each spouse are all factors that are assumed to affect the 
distribution of power within the household. According to the unitary model, none of these 
factors should affect the demand for goods. The choice of factors in each study strongly 
depends on the assumptions made on the issues prevailing in the estimation. Although 
individual incomes are likely to be related to the distribution of power within the 
household, it is difficult to argue that the distribution of income is exogenous to 
household demand for goods. Thus, some studies rely on context-specific features of the 
population under study to select the distribution factors that are likely to affect the 
distribution of power within the household, such as assets brought at time of marriage.14 
1.3.2 The collective model of the household 
In contrast to the unitary model, the collective model only imposes Pareto-
efficiency on the allocation decisions of the individual household members. The outcome 
is Pareto-efficient if no one in the family can be made better off without making someone 
else worse off.  
As before, I consider a model where only the head of household and his spouse 
participate in the decision-making. The utility functions Uf and Um are assumed to satisfy 
the standard differentiability conditions. Both utility functions depend on the household 
health status. As before, health H production is affected by the nutritional status of the 
household N and by household and locality characteristics θh and θl. Nutrition itself 
                                                                                                                                                 
Concerning household nutrition, Thomas (1990) finds a differential effect of husband’s income and wife’s 
income on the per capita intakes of calories and proteins with data from urban Brazil. 
14 For example, in Indonesia, women are found to retain property rights to assets brought at time of 





depends on the consumption of K food items X1,…, Xk and household characteristics µh. 
The family with total income Y optimally chooses to consume quantities X1,…, Xk of K 
food items at prices p1,…, pk and a composite good Z, The collective model imposes that 
the basket of goods collectively chosen by the spouses is Pareto-optimal. The 
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In the dual problem, the household maximizes a weighted sum of the husband’s 
utility and wife’s utility. Let 1 2( , )A Aλ  be the factor weighting the spouses’ preferences 
in the household welfare function, where A1 and A2 are distribution factors affecting the 
distribution of power within the household. The factor 1 2( , )A Aλ  is not a preference 
parameter. It does not affect the preferences of the decision-makers. It only weights their 
respective utility functions in the household objective function. The weight factor also 
depends on all the exogenous variables of the optimization problem. Yet, it is the 
additional distribution factors A1 and A2 that identify the collective model. Finding such 
factors that are independent of preferences, budget constraint and technology constraints 
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The unitary model is a special case of the collective model wherein individual 
household members have the same preferences (i.e., (.) (.)f mU U= ). In the collective 
model, the demands for food Xk are given by: 
1 2(2)       :    ( , , ( , , ), , , ).k k h l hk X X p Y p A Aλ θ θ µ∀ =  
Pareto-efficiency can be empirically verified by testing the hypothesis that the 
ratio of the effects of the two distribution factors across pairs of goods is constant. This 
ratio would be equal to one if the unitary model holds. The idea is that the distribution 
factors, such as individual non-labor incomes, only affect consumption of a good through 
their effect on the factor weighting the utility function of each partner in the household 
objective function. The Pareto-efficiency assumption is justified if one considers the 
family as the place where household members play a repeated game and each household 
member knows the preferences of the other household members in the household.  
For any two goods k and l, a testable implication of Pareto-efficiency15 is captured 
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Testing the null hypothesis of Pareto-efficiency requires selecting variables that 
represent the distribution factors A1 and A2. Bourguignon, et al. (1993) find that the ratio 
of the effects on commodity demands of each household member’s individual income are 
constant across goods using data on French households in which both spouses work full 




households in Taiwan. Browning and Chiappori (1998) use the log of the ratio of wife’s 
earnings to husband’s earnings and the wife’s log earnings as the two distribution factors 
to test for Pareto-efficiency in a budget shares system for Canadian households. They 
cannot reject Pareto-efficiency. Thomas, Contretas and Frankenberg (2002) provide 
evidence that Indonesian households make Pareto-efficient decisions with respect to 
children’s health. They consider the value of assets brought to marriage by each spouse 
as the two distribution factors affecting the distribution of power within the household.  
In contrast, using data from sub-Saharan Africa on agricultural production 
decisions for plots operated by men and women living in the same household, Udry 
(1996) rejects the Pareto-efficiency assumption underlying the collective models. He 
explains the inefficiency as the consequence of missing markets in land, labor and/or 
assets in Ghana. Similarly, expenditure patterns of households in Cote d'Ivoire are found 
to be Pareto-inefficient (Duflo and Udry, 2003). According to the authors, the allocation 
of resources is dictated by social norms. The inefficiency arises because of the lack of 
cooperation in the household generated by information asymmetries and/or enforcement 
problems. In addition, using Canadian data, Phipps and Burton (1998) find that income 
pooling can be rejected for certain goods but not for others. This suggests that the ratio of 
male and female income effects across pairs of goods is not constant.  
Finally, non-Pareto-efficient decisions are consistent with a model in which each 
spouse is responsible for making decisions on different goods, as in the separate sphere 
bargaining model of Lundberg and Pollak (1993). In the noncooperative equilibrium, 
family public goods are under-supplied because of the lack of coordination between the 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 In order to test for Pareto-efficiency, one needs to identify two factors that affect the distribution of 




individual household members. Yet, the supply of public goods is higher in the case 
where traditional gender roles serve as a focal point for the division of responsibilities 
than in a setting with independent optimizing individuals. Pareto-efficient outcomes 
could emerge from cooperative bargaining if the transaction costs related to the 
negotiation, monitoring and enforcement of the agreements between household members 
are low compared to the benefit of moving from the traditional gender role equilibrium to 
a Pareto-efficient equilibrium. 
1.3.3 Decision-making in the extended family context 
In the extended family setting, all income earners participate in the household 
decision-making. If the income pooling restriction holds in this context, a test of the 
unitary model is based on the result that, once total expenditures are controlled for, 
individual incomes should not affect the demand for goods. There is an issue in the 
extended family setting with adding many individual income variables to perform this 
test because the lack of variation in the income data could lead to very imprecise 
estimates for each individual income effect.  
Yet, in the unitary model of household behavior, for a given budget constraint, the 
number of income earners should not affect the allocation of resources. Thus, I exploit 
this restriction in order to test the unitary model in the extended family context. All of the 
literature on intrahousehold bargaining focuses on families with two decision makers. 




1.4 Empirical model 
1.4.1 A setting with two decision-makers 
The unitary model implies that how much each spouse contributes to the 
household should not matter, only total income matters. More generally, no distribution 
factor should enter the demand for calories once we control for total household 
expenditures, differences in tastes and household technology. A distribution factor is 
defined as a factor that shifts power within the household but does not affect household 
preferences or technology directly nor the budget line. Testing the Pareto-efficiency 
assumption requires the use of two distribution factors and several goods. Following 
Browning and Chiappori (1998), I estimate two models for families where only the head 
of the household and his spouse are assumed to participate in decision-making. I consider 
the extended family setting in the next sub-section.  
The restricted collective model (2.1) includes only one distribution factor, the log 
of the wife’s non-labor income. The unrestricted collective model (2.2) is applied to the 
demand for calories from four food groups, i.e. calories from vegetables and fruits, 
calories from cereals and grains, calories from meat and meat products and calories from 
other food. Model (2.2) includes two distribution factors, the log of the wife’s non-labor 
income and the log of the husband’s labor income.16 The unrestricted collective model 
allows testing of the Pareto-efficiency assumption for the nutrition decisions. Apart from 
the distribution factors, the equation describing the household demand for calorie 
                                                 
16 The use of natural logarithms allows interpreting the coefficients as elasticity measures. The logarithmic 
transformation is useful when the distribution of a variable in level is highly skewed, which is the case for 




consumption includes the log of the per capita value of consumption.17 Value of 
consumption is the preferred proxy for household wealth because it fluctuates less than 
current income.18 Note that one peso is added to both the wife’s income and the 
husband’s income. The restricted collective model is as follows: 
(2.1)       ln ln ln ,
ln       is the log of per mouth household calorie consumption,
ln     is the log of per capita value of consumption,
     is the log of the wife's non la
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bor income,
Z             is a vector of household and locality characteristics, 
             is the error term,
, , ,  are parameters to be estimated.
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The models underlying equations (1) and (2) require that the prices of goods be 
included in a demand function. Prices of the ten most commonly consumed food items,  
i.e. tomatoes, onions, maize tortillas, noodle, rice, beans, eggs, coffee, sugar and 
vegetable oil, are included in the Z vector.19 Household size and household composition 
are included to capture the effect of economies of scale. The number of individuals in 
different age and gender groups and the logarithm of household size capture household 
composition. Households derive utility not from nutrition directly, but from the effect of 
nutrition on health. Thus, I add household and village characteristics that affect the 
production of health and nutrition (e.g. presence at the locality level of health facilities, 
access to a sewage system and to electricity, husband’s years of education and wife’s 
                                                 
17 The value of consumption is denoted lnPCE and β is referred to as the expenditure elasticity of calories 
for the sake of brevity. Strauss and Thomas (1990) estimate the shape of the calorie expenditure curve non-
parametrically using data from urban Brazil. Bhalotra and Attfield (1998) carry out a semi-parametric 
estimation of the income-nutrition relationship for rural Pakistan. Both find that the calorie expenditure 
curve is non-linear in the sense that the elasticity of calories decreases with household wealth. The 
PROGRESA program targets the poorest households thus the sample is likely to be homogeneous in terms 
of income. In this case, non-linearities are likely to be nonexistent. 
18 Seasonality needs to be taken into account when measuring income, especially agricultural income. 





years of education). Husband's education and wife's education are also likely to capture 
taste differences between households. If they are not included, these variables would be 
absorbed into the error term and would likely generate spurious correlation between the 
error term and the income variables.  
The unrestricted collective model for calories consumed from four different food 
groups is obtained by adding husband's earnings as an additional distribution factor.  
The unrestricted model is as follows: 
21
(2.2) :        ln ln ln ln ,
ln      is the log of per month household calorie consumption from food group ,
ln    is the log of per capita value of consumption,
ln
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 is the log of the wife's non labor income,
ln  is the log of the husband's labor income,
Z             is a vector of household and locality characteristics, 





α β γ θ  are parameters to be estimated.
 
In order to test for the Pareto-efficiency assumption, distribution factors should 
enter all equations for the four food groups in the same way. However, note that for any 
differentiable monotonic function (.)φ of Ai, the Pareto-efficiency condition stated above 
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Thus, the test result should be the same whether husband’s income and wife’s 
income enter the equation in levels or in logarithmic form. 
                                                                                                                                                 




1.4.2 The extended family setting 
In the extended family set-up, all income earners participate in decision-making. 
That is, extended families include any households where the head and/or his spouse is 
likely to share with other household members the decision-making on the allocation of 
total household income because the other household members contribute to household 
income.  
From one round of the survey to the next, some individual household members 
start earning income and others quit their job, are fired, retire or lose their non-labor 
income. For a given level of household income, changes in the number of income earners 
should not affect changes in per capita calorie consumption. The estimation is based on a 
first-difference model that relates changes in calorie consumption to changes in the 
number of income earners. The first-differencing transformation is denoted by ∆ , and is 
equal to the change from period (t-1) to period t of the variables of interest. In the 
transformation, the first round of data is lost. The empirical model is based on the 
estimation of equation (2.3): 
(2.3)       ln ln ,
ln  is the log of per mouth household calorie consumption,
ln    is the log of per capita value of consumption,
  is the number of individuals 
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Z is a vector of household characteristics, 
is the error term,
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In addition, I distinguish between the effect of an additional female earner from 
the effect of an additional male earner, as well as the effect of an additional household 
member who starts earning income from the effect of an additional household member 
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∆       is the number of male who starts earning some income,
       is the number of male who stops earning some income,






         is the number of female who stops earning some income,
Z is a vector of household characteristics, 
is the error term,
, , ,   are parameters to be estimated, , , , .g
Nfdrop
g me fe md fd
ε




1.4.3 Testing models of household behavior 
1.4.3.1 Testing the unitary model 
In the two decision-makers setting, the restricted collective model (2.1) allows me 
to test whether the unitary model holds for total calories consumed by testing whether, 
once you condition on household expenditures, the wife’s non-labor income affects the 
quantity of calories consumed by the household. The test is based on the null hypothesis: 
:   0.γ =0H  
If applied to the demand for calories from the four different food groups, the 
restricted collective model (2.1) can also be used to test the unitary model restriction for 
the demands for calories from each food group.  
Alternatively, the unrestricted collective model (2.2) provides a basis for testing 
the unitary model restriction for the calories consumed from any food group k using the 
following hypothesis: 
1 2:    0.
k kγ γ= =0H  
In the extended family framework, testing the unitary model restriction consists in 




change in calorie demand conditional on the change in consumption, based on equation 
(2.3): 
:   0.γ =0H  
Alternatively, if based on equation (2.4), testing the unitary model consists in 
testing the following null hypothesis: 
:   0.fd fe md meγ γ γ γ= = = =0H  
1.4.3.2 Testing the Pareto-efficiciency assumption 
Testing the Pareto-efficiency assumption requires the estimation of the 
unrestricted collective model (2.2) for the various food groups. A Wald test for non-linear 










Testing ratios of coefficients can be problematic when denominators are close to 
zero. An alternative version of this test for any single pair of goods (k, l) is specified as: 
1 2 2 1:    0.
k l k lγ γ γ γ× − × =0H  
In order to test for Pareto-efficiency in a joint manner for the calories consumed 
from the different food groups, a Wald test is computed for the following non-linear 
restrictions: 
1 2 1 2
1 2 2 1
2 4 4 2
1 2 1 2
3 4 4 3
1 2 1 2
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Under the null hypothesis, the Wald test is asymptotically distributed as a chi-
square with three degrees of freedom. Rejecting the joint null hypothesis is a rejection of 
the Pareto-efficiency assumption underlying the collective model. This is the most 
general test for the Pareto-efficiency assumption but it is based on a non-linear 
hypothesis. The power of the Wald test may be limited, especially when an efficient 
estimator is not used. The precision of 2SLS estimates is related to the correlation 
between the endogenous variable and the instruments, as shown below: 
2 1 1
2 2
Est. ( ) [ ' ( ' ) ' ] ,
                      is the IV estimate for the effect of the distribution factors,
                      is the estimate for ,
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 of exogenous variables,
                      is the set of instrumental variables.W
 
A strong correlation between X and W is associated with more precise IV 
estimates of the effects of the distribution factors. In the opposite, the use of weak 
instruments may lead to a failure to reject the null hypothesis of Pareto-efficiency when it 
is false. 
1.5 Empirical issues and estimation strategy 
1.5.1 Estimation issues 
1.5.1.1 Total expenditures 
Estimating the expenditure elasticity of calories is problematic because of the 
likely endogeneity between expenditures and calories consumed (Bouis and Haddad 
1992; Bouis 1994). There are three possible sources of endogeneity. First, when the total 
value of consumption is used to capture household wealth, then any measurement error in 




the value of consumption (the explanatory variable). A problem of common measurement 
error arises. Second, data usually over-estimate consumption for rich households, because 
they include consumption by non-household members (e.g. employees) and usually 
under-estimate consumption for poor households, whose members often eat on the 
workplace (e.g. agricultural workers, domestic workers). The error term in the equation 
for calories consumed is then correlated with household wealth. Third, another potential 
endogeneity issue can rise from the existence of a feedback effect from nutrition to 
income, as described in the efficiency wage literature (Stiglitz 1976).  
Two main approaches are taken to address the endogeneity problem. First, when 
panel data are available, one can specify a model with fixed effects or random effects 
estimates that allow for unobserved, time-invariant family heterogeneity (Behrman and 
Deolalikar 1987). Second, the value of consumption is instrumented using individual 
incomes or assets and household characteristics. Household or individual income is used 
if the main source of endogeneity comes from measurement error because household or 
individual incomes are highly correlated with total expenditures and uncorrelated with 
the measurement error in calories. Once we control for expenditures, income should not 
affect demand and can be excluded and used as an instrument. If endogeneity also arises 
from unobserved variables correlated with expenditures, then household assets can be 
used as instruments. Subramanian and Deaton (1996) review the empirical evidence on 
the food income elasticity. They show that the OLS estimate for the income elasticity of 
calories, after adjusting the calorie aggregate to account for household members eating 





1.5.1.2 Individual incomes 
Three main empirical issues arise in estimating the effect of the intrahousehold 
distribution of income.  
First, it is difficult to argue that the individual incomes are exogenous with respect 
to the outcome of interest. In the context of developed countries, researchers usually 
avoid this issue by restricting their sample to couples where both partners are full-time 
workers. If most of the variation in labor supply occurs between occupation, controlling 
for the occupations of husbands and wives becomes a mean to hold labor supply constant 
across households. In the case of developing countries, restricting the sample to couples 
where both spouses work full-time would lead to very selective samples.  
The endogeneity issue concerns labor income and to a lesser extent non-labor 
income. Earnings are the product of a wage rate and the number of hours worked. It is 
plausible that decisions on labor supply and consumption are made jointly. Differential 
effects of husband’s earnings and wife’s earnings would thus be consistent with the 
unitary model when wife’s income picks up something else. Phipps and Burton (1998) 
find that expenditures on restaurant meals respond more strongly to the wife’s income 
than to the husband’s income. In their review of the literature on bargaining and 
distribution in marriage, Lundberg and Pollak (1996) interpret this finding as a price 
effect. 20 In addition, non-labor income is often comprised of pensions which represent 
the outcome of past labor supply choices.  
                                                 
20 The opportunity cost of the wife’s time accounts for a large part of the cost of home prepared meals, 




Second, the differential effect of male and female incomes can be driven by 
different measurement errors in male and female incomes. This issue raises concerns 
about the interpretation of the results (Haddad 1999).  
Third, the data are usually concentrated in certain regions of the joint distribution 
of husband’s income and wife’s income. In particular, in most developing countries 
datasets, as in the PROGRESA control localities, women have little income. Some 
combinations of male and female income, such as high female income-low male income, 
are unlikely to be found in the data. Thus, a problem of support arises. This means that 
there is little variation to parametrically identify and single out the effects of husband’s 
income and wife’s income, making identification of the effects difficult. Because 
PROGRESA gives income to women in the treatment group, this dataset is useful for 
examining the role of the mother’s income in household decisions.  
In sum, studying the effect of the distribution of income on household decisions is 
complicated by issues of endogeneity, measurement error and the lack of support in the 
data for the joint distribution of incomes. 
In addition to instrumenting for income, one way to get around these problems is 
to exploit exogenous changes in income. Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) 21 and 
Duflo (2003) 22 exploit natural experiment settings characterized by an exogenous change 
in the intrahousehold distribution of income. These studies show that the distribution of 
                                                 
21 Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) exploit a natural experiment in the UK where child allowance 
benefits were redistributed to women to test for income pooling. However, along with a change in the 
distribution of income within marriage, a change in policy instruments, i.e. from tax relief to the father to 
direct child allowance to the mother, also occurred. 
22 Duflo (2003) exploits a natural experiment setting in South Africa. She finds that pensions received by 
women had a large impact on the anthropometric status of girls living in the same household and none on 
that of boys. In contrast, pensions received by men have no effect on either boys or girls. The differential 
effect on children’s health of the old age pension in South Africa according to the gender of the recipient is 




income within the household impacts decisions and constitute convincing pieces of 
evidence. Although PROGRESA allocates benefits to women in randomly selected 
localities, in the ideal experiment for this study, PROGRESA would have allocated cash 
transfers to men in some randomly selected villages and to women in other randomly 
selected villages. In general, studies based on natural experiments do not provide direct 
substantive evidence on the extent to which changes in spouses’ income translate into 
changes in consumption levels because the policy changes include more than just a 
change in income.  
Using a model with family-specific fixed effect, Thomas, Contreras and 
Frankenberg (2002) find evidence of a differential effect of male and female value of 
assets brought at time of marriage on girls’ health outcomes and boys’ health outcomes in 
Indonesia. This study only exploits within-household variation but obtains estimates that 
are robust to measurement error. The authors find a differential effect of higher wife’s 
assets for girls and boys, which provides evidence on gender discrimination. However, 
the authors fail to assess the magnitude of the effect of wife’s assets on the levels of the 
children’s health measures. Instead, what they estimate is the effect on the gap between 
health outcomes for boys and girls of an additional rupiah in the hands of the mother.  
1.5.2 Estimation strategy 
In this paper, I treat the value of consumption and the distribution factors in 
model (2.1) and model (2.2) as endogenous.  
In the unitary model, I use two sets of instruments for the value of consumption: 
(i) dwelling characteristics, and (ii) dwelling characteristics along with total household 




material the floor is made of. Definitions of the variables and descriptive statistics are 
given in Table 1.3. 
In the restricted collective model, women's non-labor income is also endogenous. 
The identification strategy is based on the targeting of benefits to mothers in treatment 
group localities. Eligible mothers in the treatment group localities receive cash payments 
from the program that are not provided to women in the control group localities during 
the evaluation period. Thus, belonging to the treatment group results in higher household 
expenditures and higher women’s income and is uncorrelated, by design, with the error 
term in the nutrition demand equations (2.1). Belonging to the treatment group qualifies 
as a valid instrument for the log of wife’s non-labor income and for expenditures. As in 
the unitary model specification, dwelling characteristics and total household income are 
used as exclusion restrictions in order to identify the effect of expenditures. 
Similarly, in the unrestricted collective model, the targeting of benefits to women 
in the treatment group, household total income and dwelling characteristics are used as 
instruments for expenditures and for the wife's non-labor income. Additional variables 
from a specific module on the spouses' families at time of marriage are used as 
instruments for spouses' incomes. They include indicators of the families' social status at 
the time of marriage. Belonging to families of higher social status is likely to result in 
higher income and is unlikely to be correlated to the error term in the nutrition demand 
equation (2.2).   
In the extended family framework, the first-difference model (2.3) corrects for 
any unobserved fixed effect (Wooldridge, 2002). Yet, measurement error, a feedback 




omission of any time-varying variable related to these variables could lead to inconsistent 
estimates. A test of the strict exogeneity assumption is based on the fact that no subset of 
the explanatory variables, in levels, should enter the first-difference specification. 
Consider the following:  
ln ln ' ln ' ,
: ' ' 0.
Cal PCE PCE NEARNERS NEARNERS Zα β β γ γ θ ε
β γ
∆ = + ∆ + + ∆ + + ∆ + ∆
= =0H
 
Note that the test is based on the assumption that expenditures enter linearly in the 
equation. Rejecting the null hypothesis provides evidence of a contemporaneous 
correlation between the explanatory variable and the error term. If the test rejects the null, 
one can estimate the first-difference equation (2.3) using 2SLS rather than OLS to correct 
for the endogeneity. A set of valid exclusion restrictions includes any of the other 
explanatory variables in levels, provided that there are sufficiently correlated with the 
endogenous variables.  
Using the same Mexican dataset I use in this study, Attanasio and Lechène (2002) 
test the income pooling restriction in a budget shares system that includes food, alcohol 
and tobacco, transportation, services, woman’s clothing, men’s clothing, girl’s clothing 
and boy’s clothing. Yet, on average, 97% and 95% of all households respectively report 
zero expenditure for alcohol and tobacco. The authors do not correct for the mass point at 
zero in the estimation of the budget shares system. Given the strength of censoring at 
zero, it is likely that the test of income pooling is based on inconsistent estimates. They 
exploit the exogenous change in women’s income created by the targeting of the 
program’s benefit to mothers within randomly selected treatment localities to instrument 




restrict the sample to household containing no more than two married adults and any 
number of children. If the PROGRESA treatment affects the number of adult members 
co-residing in the household, then using the PROGRESA treatment variable as an 
instrument is inappropriate because it is correlated with the error term in the outcome 
equation. Along with the random allocation of benefits between treatment group women 
and control group women, the authors use village-level agricultural wages as an 
additional instrument in order to identify the system. Since the PROGRESA villages 
strongly rely on agriculture, high village-level wages are likely to occur in villages who 
experience a good harvest. People who live in these villages are also likely to have higher 
food consumption than people living in villages that have experienced low agricultural 
yields. Thus, if the village-level aggregates captures local conditions that affects nutrition 
in the village, using them as an identifying restriction would lead to inconsistent 
estimates. The authors reject the income pooling restriction in the budget shares system. 
They do not test the Pareto-efficiency assumption.  
Rubalcava, Teruel and Thomas (2002) estimate a budget shares system similar to 
Attanasio and Lechene (2002) using the PROGRESA data. One of the main differences is 
that they split food budget share into budget shares for four categories of food, i.e. budget 
share for vegetables, fruits, tortilla and beans, and meat. The other equations in the 
budget shares are similar to the ones in Attanasio and Lechene (2002). The other main 
difference is methodological. The authors estimate the effect of the PROGRESA actual 
transfer amount controlling for total family expenditures using OLS on three separate 
samples, i.e. all treatment and control households, only eligible households in the 




not deal with the endogeneity problems in income or expenditures. Instead, they find that 
the estimates of the effect of PROGRESA cash transfers are similar in magnitude in the 
three samples. This finding leads them to interpret the PROGRESA transfer effect as the 
effect of a change in women’s bargaining power rather than the effect of non-linearities 
in the Engel curve, or the effect of other components of PROGRESA such as the 
conditionality of the grant or the nutrition education from mandatory health talks. Yet, 
the actual PROGRESA transfer amounts sent to households are a reflection of household 
choice to participate and comply with program requirements. Thus, this variable, unlike 
the treatment dummy from the experiment, is no longer exogenous to consumption 
shares. Finding close estimates from three different samples does not guarantee that any 
of the estimates are consistent, especially when endogeneity problems are not dealt with. 
1.5.3 Potential caveats 
1.5.3.1 The effect of belonging to the treatment group on nutrition 
Belonging to the treatment group could impact nutrition decisions through the 
health talks that the households are required to attend in order to receive benefits, and not 
just through the income effect. The health talks are held in local clinics by nurses and 
primary health-care practitioners. Nutrition is discussed among 25 other themes related to 
health such as hygiene, immunization and family planning. Emphasis is on preventive 
health care. Nutrition-related lectures include how to detect early malnutrition, how to get 
safe food, water treatment, and how to treat diarrhea by oral rehydration. In addition, 
beneficiaries' consumption could be affected by the receipt of nutritional in-kind 
supplements. These are given to eligible households with young malnourished children, 




First, I assess the effect of TREATED on nutrition in the unitary model by 
separately testing the hypothesis that TREATED is a valid identifying exclusion as in 
Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2003). This test allows assessing the validity of the 
instruments one by one. Thus, it complements the standard test of over-identifying 
restrictions. In the collective models, after conditioning on individual income, I use the 
same test to assess the validity of TREATED as an instrument. Second, although it is 
difficult to disentangle the impacts of the different components of the program on 
nutrition, some information is specific to the potential effect of health lectures on 
nutrition. As suggested by the themes covered during the health talks, the impact might 
not be so much in term of the diversity of the diet than in terms of hygiene related diet 
quality, e.g how to store food to avoid contamination by germs. Furthermore, qualitative 
evidence from field trips suggests that because of over-crowding in the room where talks 
are given, the impact of health talks on nutrition is likely to be minor. Third, by splitting 
the sample into two sub-samples “with young children” and “without young children”, I 
compare the results from the tests of over-identifying restrictions. The idea is that the 
instrument TREATED is more likely to have an effect on family nutrition beyond its 
effect on the endogenous regressors for the sub-sample “with young children” than on the 
sub-sample “without young children”. 
1.5.3.2 Simultaneity in children schooling and the take-up of the program 
Since school grant money is only given to women whose children are regularly 
attending school, the decision to take-up the transfer and decision to invest in children’s 
education are made jointly. For this reason, rather than the take-up of benefits, I use the 




treatment households in the program could lead to a weak correlation in the first stage 
equation between the endogenous variables and the instrument. Any other heterogeneity 
in treatment could only affect the strength of the first stage correlation. Belonging to the 
treatment group is an indicator of the offer to treat, which is an exogenous variable with 
respect to household choice. Whether households decide to send children to school or not 
could only affect the findings because of a weak correlation in the first stage equation 
between the offer to treat dummy and the endogenous variables, which can be checked 
using a standard t-test. The issue of simultaneity between the children schooling decision 
and the take-up of the program is more problematic in studies that include education 
spending as a separate equation in the system, such as Attanasio and Lechene (2002) and 
Rubalcava, Teruel and Thomas (2002). 
1.5.3.3 Other considerations 
Another potential instrument for expenditures and the distribution of income is 
the amount households are entitled to receive. The advantage of this instrument is that it 
has more variability than the dummy variable identifying households in the treatment 
group. However, a problem with using this variable is that the grant awards that 
constitute the larger part of the transfer vary with the gender and degree of advancement 
of children. Thus, the amount households are entitled to receive varies with household 
composition and is therefore collinear with other variables one would like to include in 
the right-hand side of the calories equation. Family composition presumably affects 
nutrition in a direct way through economies of scale. Omitting the family composition 
variables would lead to a correlation between the benefit amount levels and the error 




of using the PROGRESA cash transfer amount as an instrument, I use the treatment 
dummy from the experiment. 
1.6 Results and discussion 
This section is organized as follows. First, I discuss the estimation results for the 
calories equations derived from the different models of household behavior in the setting 
with two decision-makers. I discuss the validity of the instruments used in the two-stage 
least squares estimation. Second, I examine the results in the extended family context. 
Third, I test the unitary model restriction and the Pareto-efficiency assumption for the 
nutrition decisions. Fourth, I discuss the substantive effect of changing the wife’s income 
on the levels of calories consumed.  
1.6.1 Estimation results in a setting with two decision-makers 
1.6.1.1 The unitary model 
According to the unitary model, income is pooled in the household. Thus, the 
unitary model acts as a benchmark.  
In the unitary model, the expenditure elasticity of total calories is found to be in 
the range 0.27-0.32. The expenditure elasticity is higher for calories from meat and meat 
products and calories from vegetables and fruits. These estimates are obtained by treating 
the value of consumption as endogenous. As mentioned in section 5, the main sources of 
endogeneity are (i) common measurement error, (ii) spurious correlation arising from a 
systematic error in accounting for the number of individuals sharing the meals, and (iii) a 
feedback effect from nutrition to the permanent income measure. The common 




are used to generate the dependent variables and the expenditures aggregate. The 
spurious correlation is corrected for using a strategy similar to Subramanian and Deaton 
(1996). Instead of dividing the value of consumption by household size, I divide it by the 
actual number of individuals who regularly eat in the household and obtain a per mouth 
value of consumption. In order to correct for endogeneity from common measurement 
error, I use per capita household income as an instrument. It is highly correlated with the 
value of consumption and uncorrelated with the measurement error. Because endogeneity 
can also arise from a feedback effect, I use dwelling characteristics as instruments. They 
are also correlated with the value of consumption but unlikely to be correlated with the 
unobserved determinants of nutrition.  
Thus, I present 2SLS estimates of the unitary model for three specifications that 
differ in terms of the instruments used and in the source of endogeneity that is corrected 
for. In Table 1.6, I only use as an instrument per capita household income. In Table 1.7, I 
only use the dwelling characteristics as instruments. In Table 1.8, I use both sets of 
instruments and test the over-identifying restrictions. I cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the instruments are orthogonal to the error term. In Table 1.9, I present the first stage 
regressions for the three different specifications. In all three cases, the test of joint 
significance of the instruments in the first stage produces an F-statistic above 10.23  
If the unitary model holds, then the treatment indicator TREATED should be a 
valid exclusion restriction in the calorie equations. The test by Baum, Schaffer and 
Stillman (2003) allows testing this hypothesis. Interestingly enough, I find that, in 
general, the treatment variable is not a valid exclusion restriction in the unitary model. 




results are consistent across the three specifications and for all equations except for 
calories from meat and meat products (Table 1.10). It questions the unitary household 
model since it suggests that PROGRESA benefits are likely to have an impact on 
nutrition beyond the income effect. Since benefits are targeted to women, these results 
could be consistent with a collective model of household behavior in which receiving 
PROGRESA benefits alters the balance of power within the household in favor of the 
women. 
1.6.1.2 The collective models 
Table 1.11 presents the 2SLS results from the estimation of the restricted 
collective model. Table 1.12 contains results for the unrestricted collective model.  
In the restricted collective model, the estimated expenditure elasticity of total 
calories is 0.28. In the unrestricted collective model, this value is 0.47. As previously, the 
expenditure elasticity is higher for calories from meat and meat products and calories 
from vegetables and fruits. In general, calorie consumption increases as the wife’s non-
labor income increases, with the exception of the calories consumed from meat and meat 
products for which the effect is negative although insignificant. The effects of changes in 
the wife’s non-labor income on calorie consumption are similar in the restricted and 
unrestricted collective models (Table 1.11 at line 2 and Table 1.12 at line 3). In addition, 
in the unrestricted collective model, husband's earnings are found to have a positive but 
insignificant effect on the consumption of vegetables and fruits and a negative and 
significant effect on the consumption of meat and meat products. In the other equations, 
the husband's earnings elasticity is found to be small (less than 0.01) and insignificant.  
                                                                                                                                                 




Per mouth calorie consumption of meat and meat products and vegetables and 
fruits increases with household size conditional on household composition. Consumption 
of other food decreases with household size conditional on household composition. In 
addition, total calories consumption is negatively associated with household size when 
controlling for household composition. Family composition, captured by the number of 
household members in different age and gender groups, significantly affects nutrition. 
Nutrition also depends on the spouses’ years of schooling. Taken jointly, availability of 
health care in the village and access to electricity and sewage have a significant effect on 
the calorie demand equations. The coefficients of prices of food items are also jointly 
significant. 
In the restricted collective model, as in the unitary model, expenditures are treated 
as endogenous and instrumented using per capita income and dwelling characteristics. In 
addition, because wife's non-labor income is treated as endogenous, I use the treatment 
dummy as an additional exclusion restriction. The last two lines of Table 1.11 provide 
information on the validity of the instruments. Taken jointly, all instruments are found to 
be valid exclusion restrictions for all equations using a test of over-identifying 
restrictions. Moreover, although in the unitary model, the treatment dummy cannot be 
used as an exclusion restriction, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that this variable is a 
valid instrument in the restricted collective model, except for the meat consumption. The 
first stages are presented in Table 1.13. Note that the strong correlation between the 





I compare tests of the exogeneity of the treatment dummy for households with 
young children (age 4 and below) and households without young children. In both cases, 
I cannot reject exogeneity of the treatment dummy using the Baum, Schaffer and Stillman 
(2003) test for one exclusion restriction. This suggests that the effect of belonging to the 
treatment group on household nutrition is mainly an income effect, even for families with 
young children who are eligible for an in-kind nutritional supplement (Table 1.14).  
In the unrestricted collective model, expenditures, wife's non-labor income and 
husband's earnings are treated as endogenous. As previously, I use per capita income,  
dwelling characteristics and the treatment dummy as instruments. In addition, I use 
spouses' characteristics at time of marriage as additional exclusion restrictions. The last 
two lines of Table 1.12 provide information on the validity of the instruments. Taken 
jointly, all instruments are found to be valid exclusion restrictions for all equations using 
a test of over-identifying restrictions. As in the restricted collective model, I cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the treatment dummy variable is a valid instrument in the 
unrestricted collective model, except for the meat consumption. Finally, the first stages 
are presented in Table 1.15. Again, the strong correlation between the instruments and the 
wife’s non-labor income is mainly due to the treatment dummy variable.  
Three conclusions can be drawn from the previous results. First, reviewing the 
test results for the instruments used in the estimation of the unitary model and the 
collective models suggests that the instruments are valid ones. Thus, the estimated effects 
of expenditures and individual incomes are consistent. Second, the strong correlation 
between the individual incomes and the instruments used for the estimation of the 




be precisely estimated. Third, holding expenditures constant, increasing wife's non-labor 
income has a positive effect on total calorie consumption and increasing husband's 
earnings has a negligible effect on total calorie consumption but a differential effect on 
calories from different groups of food.  
1.6.2 Estimation results in the extended family setting 
In the extended family setting, I estimate a first-difference model for equation 
(2.3) and equation (2.4). In the underlying model, the dependent variable is the per mouth 
amount of calories consumed in the household for both equations. The explanatory 
variables common to both equations include the per capita value of consumption, 
household size and household composition and other time-constant household 
characteristics, such as husband’s and wife’s education. The equation (2.3) includes the 
number of individuals in the household earning any income. In equation (2.4), I include 
as explanatory variables the number of male household members who started earning 
income, the number of male household members who stopped earning income, the 
number of female household members who started earning income, and the number of 
female household members who stopped earning income between two successive 
periods. The first-difference transformation corrects for any fixed unobserved effect. All 
time-invariant explanatory variables are differenced away in the context of the first-
difference model. 
In order to test the strict exogeneity assumption, I include in the first-difference 
OLS regression the potentially endogenous variables in levels. The first column of Table 
1.16 shows that, in equation (2.3), the number of income earners has a significant effect 




consumption is insignificant. The second column of Table 1.16 shows that, in equation 
(2.4), the number of male income earners and the number of female income earners have 
a significant effect on the change in calories consumed. Thus, I estimate the first-
difference model with 2SLS using exclusion restrictions to instrument for the change in 
the number of income earners in equation (2.3), and to instrument for the number of 
males and females who started or stopped earning income between two successive 
periods in equation (2.4).  
As mentioned above, any of the explanatory variables in levels can act as valid 
exclusion restrictions, provided that they are sufficiently correlated to the endogenous 
variable. Among these, the number of 15 to 19 year olds is found to be sufficiently 
correlated with the change in the number of income earners. This is consistent with 
teenagers being the additional income earners in the family. I use the value of per capita 
household income as additional exclusion restriction in equation (2.3). As expected, this 
variable is strongly correlated with the change in the number of income earners (Table 
1.17). I test whether this additional variable is a valid instrument using the test of 
orthogonality for one exclusion restriction. I cannot reject the exogeneity of this 
particular variable. Using a standard test of over-identification, I cannot reject the 
exogeneity of all the instruments taken jointly (Table 1.18).  
In equation (2.4), I instrument for four endogenous variables, i.e. the number of 
male household members who started earning income, the number of male household 
members who stopped earning income, the number of female household members who 
started earning income, and the number of female household members who stopped 




in the equation (2.3). In addition, I use the treatment dummy, the number of 20-34 years 
old female household members and the number of 20-34 years old male household 
members. These young adults constitute a pool of income earners in the family. The use 
of the treatment dummy as an exclusion restriction increases the precision of the 2SLS 
estimates. Table 1.17 shows that the instruments are strongly correlated with the 
endogenous variables. Using a test of exogeneity for a single instrument, I cannot reject 
the exogeneity of the treatment dummy. In addition, I cannot reject the exogeneity of all 
the instruments taken jointly. These test results are reported at the bottom of Table 1.18, 
in the second column. 
The 2SLS estimation results for equation (2.3) are shown in the first column of 
Table 1.18. I find that a 1 percent change in the per capita value of consumption is 
associated with a 0.46 percent change in the per mouth amount of calories consumed. An 
additional income earner is associated with a decrease in calorie consumption on the 
order of 9 percent.  
Yet, the effect of an additional income earner on calorie consumption varies with 
the gender of the household member. In addition, the effect of a household member who 
starts earning income is not symmetric to the effect of a household member who stops 
earning income, as shown in the second column of Table 1.18. When a female household 
member starts earning income, family calorie consumption increases by 19 percent. 
When it is a male household member who starts earning income, family calorie 
consumption decreases by 10 percent. When a female household member stops earning 




household member who stops earning income, family calorie consumption increases by 
17 percent. 
1.6.3 Testing the unitary model restriction and the Pareto-efficiency assumption 
for the nutrition decisions 
1.6.3.1 Testing the unitary model in the two decision-makers setting 
Table 1.19 provides results from testing the unitary model restriction in the 
restricted collective model (column 1) and the unrestricted collective model (column 2) 
for total calories and calories from each food group. The unitary model is rejected in all 
cases except for the consumption of meat and meat products in both specifications. 
1.6.3.2 Testing the unitary model restriction in the extended family setting 
In the extended family setting, I find in all specifications a significant effect of the 
change in the number of income earners on changes in household calorie consumption, 
holding changes in household expenditures constant. In particular, changes in the number 
of male income earners have a stronger effect on the level of calorie consumption than 
changes in the number of female income earners (see Table 1.18). Thus, in the extended 
family setting, the income pooling restriction does not hold. Controlling for total 
household expenditures, the number of individuals in the household who are earning 
some labor income matters for the calorie consumption decision. The unitary model is 
rejected in the case of the extended family. 
1.6.3.3 Testing the Pareto-efficiency assumption 
Using the unrestricted collective model with two distribution factors, I reject the 




and fruits calories / cereals and grains calories” and the pair “cereals and grains calories / 
other food calories”. The results are presented in Table 1.20.  
If the Pareto-efficiency assumption is tested jointly over all pairs of goods, the 
joint hypothesis has a chi-square statistic equal to 7.14 that corresponds to a p-value of 
0.094. I reject at the 10% level the Pareto-efficiency assumption on the allocation of 
resources between spouses with respect to the calorie consumption decisions. 
1.6.4 How is nutrition affected by changing the spouse’s income? 
After providing statistical evidence of an effect of the distribution of power within 
the household on nutrition, I discuss the substantive importance of this effect.  
According to the estimates from the restricted collective model, a 100 percent 
change in the wife’s non-labor income is associated with a one percent change in total 
calories consumed. The effect is a little higher for calories from vegetables and fruits, 
calories from cereals and grains and calories from other food, but still in the 1 percent 
range. Changing the wife's non-labor income has no effect on meat consumption.  
Results from the unrestricted collective model are consistent with these findings. 
In addition, the effect of husband's earnings on vegetable and fruits consumption, meat 
consumption and consumption of other food is found to be equal to the effect of wife's 
income. The negative effect of husband's earnings on consumption of cereals and grains 
more than offsets the positive effect of wife's income. Yet, changes in husband's income 
have no effect on total calorie consumption.   
Overall, I find that the effects of changes in spouses’ incomes are small in a 
substantive sense. This is consistent with recent results in the literature: “The key issue in 




(Thomas 2002). Does this finding imply that the unitary model may hold approximately? 
I discuss this question further below.  
First, the tests of income pooling and Pareto-efficiency that are used in this study 
require the inclusion of distribution factors in the model equation. However, in practice, 
the number and nature of the distribution factors that determine the distribution of power 
within the household are not clearly defined. As mentioned in Section 3, although the 
distribution of income is likely to affect the distribution of power within the household, 
other factors could also have a role.24 Omitting these factors might not affect the testing 
of the unitary model restriction and the Pareto-efficiency assumption. Yet, these other 
factors might have a greater impact on the distribution of power within the household 
than spouses’ incomes. 
Second, most women in the sample have low income. A 100 percent change in 
income is a small amount in absolute terms. Thus, the support problem may play a role in 
the low elasticity found in this study. 
Third, the unitary model is also rejected in the extended family settings, i.e. for 
households where individuals other than the head of household or his spouse can be 
earning some labor income. I find that when a women starts earning some income, family 
calorie consumption increases. It decreases when a man starts earning income.  
1.7 Conclusion 
How does the distribution of power within the household affect the nutrition of its 
members? I explore this question using a unique dataset collected for the evaluation of 
                                                 
24 For example, current assets and assets brought at time of marriage have been found to influence the 




the largest social program in rural Mexico. In this sample, poor households in randomly 
selected control localities did not receive program benefits. I exploit data from this social 
experiment to (1) test models of household decision-making, (2) provide some insights 
on how much nutrition is affected by changes in the distribution of income within the 
household and in the number of income earners in the household.  
Focusing on the nutrition decision, I consider two settings. The first relies on the 
assumption that, even when household members other than the head of household and his 
spouse earn income, the sole two decision-makers are the head and his spouse. This is a 
strong assumption, which is relaxed in the extended family setting. The extended family 
setting allows every household member who earns income to participate in decision-
making. 
I reject the income pooling restriction underlying the unitary model of the 
household in a setting with two decision-makers. In addition, I reject the Pareto-
efficiency assumption underlying the collective model of the household for the calorie 
consumption decisions. There is an allocation of resources towards consumption of the 
various food groups that is Pareto-superior to the one collectively chosen in the 
household. This result is consistent with the separate sphere bargaining model (Lundberg 
and Pollak 1993) for which gender roles assign responsibility to each partner for certain 
decisions. The results are also consistent with the existence of information asymmetries 
at the household level, or problems in the enforcement of household agreements. Yet, I 
find that doubling the wife’s non-labor income is associated to only minor changes in 




In the extended family setting, with possibly more than two income earners, I find 
that, for a given level of household income, changes in the number of income earners 
lead to changes in per capita calorie consumption. This leads to a rejection of the unitary 
model income pooling restriction in the case of the extended family. I find that calorie 
consumption increases when a woman starts earning income and decreases when it is a 
man who starts earning income.  
From a policy standpoint, the rejection of the income pooling restriction suggests 
that the intrahousehold distribution of power over resources affect household decision-
making. When I relax the assumption that the head of household and his spouse are the 
sole two decision-makers, I find that the implications of the unitary model do not hold for 
extended families in poor rural regions of Mexico. In addition, in the extended family 
setting, when a woman starts earning income, family calorie consumption increases by 19 
percent. This is in contrast to the findings in the two decision-makers setting, for which 
changes in food consumption associated with changes in the intrahousehold allocation of 
income are found to be small. This difference highlights the importance of taking into 
account the characteristics of households in poor countries in the empirical modelling of 





Chapter 2: Heterogeneous program impacts in PROGRESA 
2.1 Introduction 
The most commonly used estimators in program evaluation provide information 
on the program mean impact. Yet, this is only a narrow answer to the question of how 
well a program works. Exploring heterogeneity in program impacts provide information 
on the distributional effects of policy interventions in a way that goes beyond mean 
impacts. It can also help to go inside the “black box” of mean program impacts and learn 
more about how policies generate their mean effects (see Heckman and Smith 1995 for a 
discussion of the main criticism towards experimental methods).  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the importance of heterogeneity in 
program impacts for the Mexican program for education, health and nutrition 
PROGRESA. Does the program have the same effect on everyone? Will some groups 
benefit more from the program than others? Most of the existing literature on 
heterogeneity of treatment effects mainly looks at the heterogeneous effect that vary with 
observed characteristics, i.e. the heterogeneity on subgroups of the population. We 
explore the heterogeneity of impacts as a function of the criteria used by PROGRESA to 
select beneficiaries. Yet, we also investigate the overall heterogeneity of program 
impacts, which includes both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Four other studies 
explore similar aspects of the distribution of impacts in the US context (Heckman, Smith 
and Clements 1997, Black, Smith, Berger and Noel 2003, Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes 
2004, and Biddle, Boden and Reville 2003). This is the first paper that investigates the 




In the next section, we describe the Mexican program for education, health and 
nutrition PROGRESA. The Mexican social program PROGRESA is a means-tested 
conditional cash transfer program. It targets the poorest households in the most remote 
rural regions of Mexico. The PROGRESA program is designed as a cash transfer 
payment given to the mother in the household upon compliance with a defined set of 
requirements (e.g. regular child attendance to school and frequent visits to health 
centers). Thus, the program has both a short-term poverty reduction objective and a 
longer-term objective in terms of investment in human capital. We describe the data and 
the experimental design. The latter consists of an experiment with randomly assigned 
treatment and control localities. Within the treatment localities, eligible households are 
offered the program benefits. Within the control localities, eligible households do not 
receive the benefits during the two-year evaluation period. Data collected in November 
1998, i.e. six months after the start of the program, as well as data collected in June 1999 
and in November 1999 are used in this study. By sending conditional cash transfers to 
households, the PROGRESA program's main objectives are to reduce household poverty, 
to increase household food consumption, to encourage investment in human capital. 
Thus, the outcomes of interest include household total expenditures and value of 
consumption, household food expenditures and value of food consumption, and the 
children’s time spent in schooling activities, income-generating activities and domestic 
activities. A summary of the evaluation of PROGRESA can be found in Skoufias (2001).  
In the third section, we present the theoretical framework for our investigation. 
Based on the program benefit scheme and on how well the program was implemented, 




model in PROGRESA. Then, we analyze the heterogeneity in program impacts on 
household welfare, consumption and time allocation that is raised by the conditionality of 
the cash transfer. 
In the fourth section, we explore the heterogeneity of impacts along observable 
characteristics. We focus on the variation in impacts as a function of the two criteria used 
by PROGRESA to select beneficiaries, i.e. a village marginality index a household 
poverty index. Both indices are constructed by the program officials using information 
collected prior to the intervention (Skoufias et al., 1999). This analysis allows us to 
assess the effectiveness of the targeting mechanism. Are the poorest households in the 
most marginal villages getting a greater program impact than less poor households from 
less marginal places? In order to answer this question, we estimate treatment effects on 
subgroups, which is the most common way to investigate the distributional impacts of a 
program. We estimate program impacts along the targeting criteria for all the outcomes of 
interest.  
In the two subsequent sections, we investigate the overall heterogeneity of 
program impacts, which includes both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Experimental data are sufficient to identify mean program impacts or impacts on 
subgroups, but do not identify unobserved heterogeneity in impacts.  
In the fifth section, we derive a lower bound for the total variance of impacts 
using results from classical probability theory. We test whether the lower bound is 
significantly different from zero. This allows us to test whether the total effect of the 
program is homogeneous over both observed and unobserved characteristics. We 




to the targeting criteria and a part that is not. It allows us to examine whether, once 
systematic variation in impacts is removed, the variance in impacts is still different from 
zero. Exploring unobserved heterogeneity is a methodological innovation in the paper. 
Yet, additional assumptions are required to further analyze the distribution of impacts. 
We assume perfect positive dependence between untreated outcome levels and treated 
outcome levels. This assumption holds if the ranks of the households are unaffected by 
the program. It allows us to estimate quantile treatment effects (QTE). The QTE 
estimation provides information on how the impact varies at different quantiles of the 
untreated distribution. We explore the QTE distributions of both the total impacts and the 
unobserved impacts for the selected outcomes.  
In the sixth section, moments of the distribution of impacts are identified under 
the assumption that the untreated outcome levels and program impacts are independent. 
This assumption means that households do not anticipate gains from the program at the 
time they decide to participate in the program, which is likely to occur when households 
are randomly assigned to a treatment and a control group. We test this assumption and we 
identify the first two moments of the distribution of impacts using a parametric random 
coefficient model. We also identify the first two moments of the distribution of both the 
total impacts and the unobserved impacts under a weaker independence assumption. We 
assume a normal distribution and estimate the distribution of impacts. Alternatively, 
when the independence assumption holds, we identify the first four moments of the 
distribution of impacts using a more flexible parametric approach. We approximate the 




We find evidence against the “common effect” assumption, which is robust to the 
assumption adopted. From the analysis on subgroups, we find evidence that there is 
variation in impacts along the targeting criteria in the treated population, that the 
geographic targeting is effective but the beneficiary selection on household poverty 
within poor localities is not. The last two findings are consistent with the findings in 
Skoufias et al. (2001) on the program targeting mechanism.  
The bounding analysis provides evidence that the total variance of impacts is 
different from zero. This result does not rely on any assumption and thus is particularly 
strong evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects. Moreover, we find that, even once 
the systematic variation in impacts is removed, the unobserved part of the variance of 
impacts is different from zero. This is further evidence of heterogeneity in program 
impacts, which is not due to systematic variation along observable characteristics. We 
also find from the bounding analysis that the experimental data are consistent with a large 
range of impact distributions. From the QTE estimation, we learn that the program 
impact on wealth and nutrition is lower for households who were at a lower level of 
wealth and nutrition prior to the intervention in the last two rounds. This is consistent 
with the theoretical prediction that treatment effect on wealth and nutrition are higher for 
the households whose cost of complying with the program requirements is the lower. The 
impacts are positive at each decile of the untreated distribution of outcomes. In the first 
round, the program impact does not vary with the untreated outcome distribution. We 
also find that the unobserved impacts distribution follow a similar pattern along the 




Under the assumption of independence between gains from the program and the 
untreated outcome levels and when impacts follow a normal distribution, we find that the 
fraction of the treated population with a positive impact ranges is higher for the latest 
rounds. This finding suggest that in the first round, some households may have supported 
the cost of the program requirements without receiving the program benefits because of 
implementation problems. Yet, for most of the outcomes of interest, the assumption of 
independence between program impacts and untreated outcome levels fails to hold. This 
is consistent with a selective compliance to program requirements in the eligible 
population.  
2.2 The PROGRESA program and data 
2.2.1 Description of the program 
The PROGRESA program targets poor rural households in Mexico. It has been 
implemented since 1998. At the end of 1999, it covered 2.6 million families, i.e., about 
40% of all rural households and one ninth of all families in Mexico. In 1999, the annual 
program budget was approximately $777 million, which corresponds to 0.2% of 
Mexico’s GDP (Skoufias, 2001). In January 2002, the Inter-American Development 
Bank approved its largest loan ever to Mexico for expanding PROGRESA to urban areas 
of the country. Despite the important recent political changes, PROGRESA remains in 
place, under the new name Opportunidad.  
The actual targeting of PROGRESA involves two stages: (1) the selection of the 
localities where PROGRESA operates, (2) the selection of beneficiary households within 




at least one primary school and a health center) are selected. Within each selected 
locality, the selection of households is based on pre-program survey information on 
household wealth that includes income and relevant household characteristics. A 
household is eligible to the program if it falls below a poverty line defined by income and 
other relevant socio-economic attributes. On average, 78% of each locality population is 
found to be poor, i.e. eligible for the program benefits. The program benefits are 
conditional income transfers and they are comprised of two components:  
3. Educational grants given to families with children in the last three years of primary 
school and secondary school children. The grant amounts vary by grade and gender in 
favor of girls and of the most advanced children and reflect opportunity costs. The 
grants are given upon attendance to school.25 A complex system of verification based 
on forms completed and signed by teachers and school directors ensures that the 
attendance requirement is met before sending money to the households. 
4. All selected households can benefit from a monetary transfer designed to help them 
improve their nutrition. This component is commonly called the food cash transfer. 
But, although households are encouraged to spend the money on food, they are not 
required to do so. In order to receive this cash transfer, they are required to make 
regular visits to health centers and to participate to health talks. Only one visit per 
year to a health center is required for adults, two to five visits a year for pregnant and 
breast-feeding women and two to seven visits a year for infants and children. In 
addition, in-kind nutritional supplements are provided to under-nourished children 




The average transfer from October 1998 to November 1999 is about 197 pesos 
per household per month26, which is equivalent to 20% of the mean value of consumption 
of a poor household. An additional requirement of PROGRESA is that households 
withdraw from other assistance programs that share similar objectives with PROGRESA, 
such as Ninos de Solidaridad, DICONSA, LICONSA and INI. 27 
2.2.2 The experimental design 
The evaluation sample is designed as an experiment with randomization of 
localities into treatment and control groups. The randomization is at the village level 
rather than at the household level in order to avoid contamination bias. Only eligible 
households in treatment localities actually receive any transfer. Eligible households in 
control localities are denied these transfers until the end of the evaluation period in 
2000.28 The random assignment of localities in treatment and control groups was 
conducted in order to evaluate the impacts of the program on a range of outcomes.29  
Behrman and Todd 1999 evaluate the randomness of the sample and find that the 
treatment and control groups mean outcomes at the locality level are similar before the 
intervention. However, they find small differences at the household and individual level. 
                                                                                                                                                 
25 Children are required to attend school with an 85% monthly attendance rate. If a child fails to meet this 
requirement, families stop receiving the educational grant for that child, but remain eligible for other 
program benefits. 
26 The figures are in November 1998 pesos and the value is approximately $20 U.S. 
27 Ninos de Solidaridad provide educational grants. DICONSA maintains subsidized prices for basic food 
items. LICONSA provide poor families with one free kilogram of tortillas and subsidize the price of milk. 
INI is targeted to indigenous people and provide lodging and food or educational grants to students. 
28 Extending the PROGRESA program to all the eligible population had to be done by phases because of 
the size of the program. For a random subset of the villages, the incorporation to the program was 
postponed for two years. Thus, this subset of the population acts as a control group.  
29 These impacts are assessed using estimators commonly used in program evaluation (e.g. the difference-
in-difference estimator). Detailed data description and mean program impacts are presented in a series of 




Note also that the existing alternative assistance programs do not operate anymore 
in all of the PROGRESA localities, i.e. the treatment and control localities. Thus, the 
difference between treatment localities average outcomes and control localities average 
outcomes gives an estimate of the mean program impact. 
All households in the selected localities are interviewed before and at several 
points in time after the start of the program. The evaluation dataset consists of repeated 
observations (panel data) for 24,000 households from 506 localities (320 assigned to the 
treatment group and the remaining 186 to the control group) over five rounds of survey 
(baseline: October 1997 and March 1998; follow-ups: November 1998, June 1999 and 
November 1999).  
In this study, I use data from the three follow-up rounds, i.e. November 1998, 
June 1999 and November 1999, because no reliable consumption data is collected before 
November 1998. These three rounds are used as cross-sections, i.e. I use data from all 
households for each of the rounds. I restrict the sample to the eligible households. I 
supplement the datasets with information collected before the implementation of the 
program in October 1997. I also supplement them with data from a specific time 
allocation module collected only once in November 1999. A description of the data used 
in this study is available in the data appendix (Appendix 3).   
2.2.3 The outcomes of interest 
The outcomes of interest in the empirical section include the wealth of the 
household measured by household total expenditures and by the value of consumption of 
all goods and services (Deaton, 1997). Improving household nutrition is a key objective 




quantitative measures of nutrition. In addition, we examine the time children spent in 
schooling activities, income-generating activities and domestic activities using a detailed 
module on time allocation. We denote income-generating activities as all of the activities 
involving work outside the house, including wage labor (for an employer, on one’s own 
firm/farm with salary or other paid casual work) and non-wage labor (as an aide, on one’s 
own firm/farm and other non-paid casual work). Domestic activities include all activities 
that take place at home and could have been realized by someone else the household 
would have hired, such as cleaning the house, washing, sewing and ironing clothes, 
shopping for the household, preparing meals and washing dishes, fetching water or wood, 
disposing garbage, taking care of animals and fields, looking after children including 
taking them to school, or looking after elderly or sick people. A third category of activity 
consists of attendance at school and time spent studying outside the classroom.30 In 
addition to data on the individual and household outcomes, individual and household 
characteristics are collected as well. 
2.3 A theoretical discussion 
In a paper on the welfare reform in the US, Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes (2004) 
find evidence of program impact heterogeneity which is consistent with the theoretical 
predictions of a standard labor supply model. In this section, we first discuss the case for 
heterogeneous program impacts versus the “common effect” model in PROGRESA based 
on the program benefit scheme and on how well the program was implemented. Then, we 
                                                 
30 Finally, leisure time is a residual, i.e. the remaining time in a day after subtracting time spent for income 
generating activities, domestic activities and school. Observations for which leisure time was less or equal 




analyze the heterogeneity in program impacts emerging from the conditionality of the 
cash transfer. 
Households with different preferences, budget sets and production sets are likely 
to respond differently to a homogeneous treatment. Yet, the design of the program can 
address this issue by varying the treatment. For example, in the case of Mexico, one 
expects parents to be less likely to send daughters to school than sons. The PROGRESA 
program addresses the problem by providing a larger grant amount for girls sent to 
school. In addition, one expects that the older the child is, the higher his or her 
opportunity cost of time in the labor market. Again, the program anticipates this source of 
heterogeneity and provides larger grants for secondary school children. The opportunity 
cost of time of children is also likely to be higher for households who hold or operate 
land. Girls who live in large households with many younger children are also more likely 
to be employed at home. Mothers whose opportunity cost of time in domestic or labor 
activities is higher are likely to bear a high cost from participating in the program, which 
would lower the overall impact of the program on their households.  
Yet, the program does not control for all potential sources of heterogeneity by 
varying the treatment. In addition, it is unclear whether the program payment schedule 
could exactly balance out differences in costs. Thus, we can expect to find heterogeneity 
in program impacts although the program treatment already varies from a household to 
another. Finally, although the program started in Spring 1998, 27% of the eligible 
households in the treatment group did not receive any cash benefits by March 2000 
according to administrative data. This is mostly due to administrative problems in the 




program without receiving the program benefits, they are likely to have experienced a 
loss in welfare and a decrease in consumption. Households who sent children to school 
and complied with program requirements have experienced delays in the receipt of the 
cash transfer due to delays in the verification of the requirements or in the delivery of the 
monetary transfers. Coady and Djebbari (1999) assess the early stages of the 
implementation of the program. 
In the remaining of the section, we discuss the effect of the conditionality of the 
educational grant on household behavior and welfare. This analysis complements the 
study by Skoufias and Parker (2001). Skoufias and Parker use a standard labor supply 
model and find that the effect of the conditionality on children’s time allocation depends 
on households preferences and initial wealth level.  
In a simplified version of the standard economic model of time allocation, a 
household composed of one adult and one child optimally chooses a composite good z, 
the child’s schooling time ts, and the adult’s and child’s leisure time la, lc. The indirect 
utility function V (.,.) is as follows: 
( , ) { ( ) . . ( ) } , where   ( ,  ,  ,  ).a c s c aXV p Y Max U X s t pX Y I w w T X z t l l= = = + + =∑  
The vector of prices associated with X is denoted p, household full income Y is 
composed to household non-labor income I and household value of the common time 
endowment T at prices wa and wc. Suppose that in a first stage, household optimal choices 
are limited to ( ,  ,  )c az l l .  
Like the indirect utility function, the partial indirect utility function is increasing 
in Y. For a given Y, the partial indirect utility function is first increasing, and then 
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Program participants must be at least as well-off taking up the program than not 
taking it up. Yet, the increase in participant welfare can reflect an increase in 
consumption or an increase in leisure time. Because households have to send children to 
school a minimum of t  hours, the welfare effects of a pure income transfers vs. tied 
income transfers are analyzed using unconstrained and constrained optimization 
problems:  
( , ) { ( ) . . } ( , , ),
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One can distinguish between four types of households based on the constrained 
and unconstrained partial indirect utility functions. Figure 1 shows how these two 
functions vary with ts. Denote by A the optimal schooling time without transfer, B the 
optimal schooling time with a pure unconditional transfer and C the optimal schooling 
time with a conditional transfer. Let g be the transfer amount. 
1. Type I households are better off accepting a tied income transfer than refusing it 
because point C is above point A. Without any aid (point A), these households were 
already sending their children to school at least the minimum of t  hours. The effect 
of the program on the child’s schooling time is thus minor. Furthermore, the optimal 
schooling time is the same whether or not the transfer is conditional (B = C): 
* *
* *
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C U C U
U C
U C
V p Y V p Y V p Y g V p Y g
t p Y t p Y t
t p Y g t p Y g t
= < + = +
= >





For Type I households, the main effect of the program consists of the pure income 
effect of the cash transfer. We can expect type I households to have higher 
expenditures after taking-up the program.  
2. Type II households also are better off accepting a tied income transfer than refusing it 
(point C is above point A). Before receiving the aid, these households choose to send 
children to school less than the minimum of t  hours (point A). When they get the 
educational grants, the children attend school more than the minimum required 
attendance level. Yet, whether they receive a conditional or an unconditional transfer 
does not affect the optimal schooling time (B = C).  
* *
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Like households of type I, type II households only benefit from the pure income 
effect of the cash transfer. With the additional PROGRESA income, children’s time 
spent in school is increased above the minimal attendance requirement level. We can 
also expect higher expenditures for these households. 
3. Type III households are similar to type II households in that (1) they are better off 
accepting a tied income transfer than refusing it, (2) before receiving the aid, children 
were sent to school less than the minimum of t  hours. However, the optimal 
schooling time these households would have chosen for their children if given an 
unconditional transfer would have been smaller than the optimal schooling chosen 
with a tied income transfer. Point C is to the right of point B. For type III households, 




pure income effect of the cash transfer and the effect of a lower price of schooling 
driven by the attendance requirement. This price effect has the standard substitution 
and income effect, which reinforces the pure income effect of the transfer.  
* *
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With the PROGRESA conditional transfer, families can exactly meet the minimum 
attendance requirement. Children spend more time studying than without a transfer. 
Yet, at income level ( )Y g+ , type III households may have to bear the cost of 
children’s foregone labor earnings due to the implicit reduction in labor time 
*( , )Ut t p Y g− +  that results from the conditionality of the grant. Thus, the grant 
impact on household expenditures may be negative for these households. We expect 
the food cash transfer benefit to have a positive effect on household expenditures. The 
net effect on expenditures could be either positive or negative.  
4. The last type of household (type IV) looks like the type II and III households in that 
they were sending children to school less than the minimum numbers of hours 
targeted by the program prior to the intervention. In addition, like type III households, 
the conditionality of the grant affects their potential welfare. However, it also affects 
the outcome of their choice. When compliance to program requirements is demanded, 
in their choice between (i) complying and receiving the grant, (ii) not complying and 
not receiving a grant, these households choose the latter. They are better off not 
taking the conditional grant than taking it. Point A is above point C. These 




labor. The costs of complying with the program requirements include the foregone 
earnings of their children. With an unconditional grant, although their demand for 
schooling would not have attained the minimum of t  hours, it would still have been 
greater than it actually is when facing the trade-off implicit in the conditional grant. 
Point B is at the right of point A. 
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Type IV households are not getting the educational grants. The only effect of the 
program on children’s time allocation and household expenditures is through the food 
cash transfer component. 
Two points can be made from this analysis. First, although the treatment is 
heterogeneous, we cannot rule out the case of heterogeneity in program impacts. 
Problems in program implementation are likely to be at the origin of lower or even 
temporary negative program impacts for some participants. Second, identifying the 
different types of households allows us to form predictions concerning the heterogeneity 
of program impacts. In particular, we find that impacts on expenditures are greater for 
households who are meeting or almost meeting program requirements prior to the 
intervention. We expect program impacts on child’s schooling for these households to be 
small or zero. These are likely to be the richest households among the eligible ones or 
households with young children. We expect to find very small program impacts on 
expenditures for households whose costs of participating are the highest. These impacts 
could even be negative for households who meet program requirements but would have 




schooling would be the largest for these households. We also expect small or zero 
program impacts on child’s schooling for households who cannot meet program 
requirements. These are likely to be the poorest households who greatly rely on child 
labor.  
Finally, note that we restricted the previous analysis to households with a single 
child. In Mexican households with more than a child, young children and boys are more 
likely to be sent to school than older children and girls. Thus, program impacts on 
schooling (labor) of older children or girls could even be negative (positive). 
 
2.4 Heterogeneity of impacts and the targeting of the program 
2.4.1 Empirical model 
If the goal of the targeting is to increase the efficiency of the program then the 
treatment should be allocated to those for which the impact is the largest.31 We explore 
the heterogeneity of impacts as a function of the two criteria used by PROGRESA to 
select beneficiaries, i.e. a village marginality index and a household poverty index. Both 
indices are constructed by the program officials using information collected prior to the 
intervention (Skoufias et al., 1999). Both indices are included in the datasets.  
The village marginality index is constructed using village-level information on the 
illiteracy rate of heads of households, on access to basic infrastructure (running water, a 
drainage system, electricity), on housing characteristics (ratio of household members to 
rooms in the house, frequency of houses where floor are made of dirt) and the importance 
                                                 





of agricultural activities in the village. The higher the value of the marginality index, the 
more remote is the village. The household poverty index takes into account household 
characteristics, family assets and per capita income. The higher the poverty score is, the 
poorer the household is. In each eligible village, households are classified as poor and 
non-poor based on this score.  
We allow the treatment effect to vary with the village marginality index and the 
household poverty index.32 If the targeting mechanism is effective, then the poorest 
households in the most marginal villages get a greater program impact than less poor 
households from less marginal places.  
In order to test this hypothesis, we estimate program impacts on household total 
expenditures and value of consumption, household food expenditures and value of food 
consumption, and the children’s time spent in schooling activities, income-generating 
activities and domestic activities (all outcomes are designed by Y in the equations below).  
The treatment group households (T = 1) are compared to the control group 
households (T= 0). We include interaction terms between the poverty index (Pindex) and 
the village marginality index (Vindex) and the treatment indicator (T).  
We control for household or individual characteristics in order to obtain more 
precise estimates. In addition, this should correct for any differences not accounted for by 
the randomization of localities into treatment and control groups. When estimating 
program impacts on nutrition and wealth, the control variables include household 
composition and characteristics of the head of household. For impacts on children's time 
allocation, the control variables include the child’s age, parent’s education, the age of the 
                                                 
32 A preliminary semi-parametric analysis suggested that a linear function is a good approximation of the 




mother and the father, whether the head of household is a female or a male, whether the 
head of household speaks an indigenous language and variables measuring the 
demographic composition of the household. Control variables are designed by X. 
We estimate the following equation. 
(1) 1 2 3
1 2 3
* * * *
* * * * * * * * .
Y Pindex Vindex Pindex Vindex
T T Pindex T Vindex T Pindex Vindex X
α α α α
β β β β δ ε
= + + + +
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First, we test whether there is any program impact on the outcome by evaluating 
the following joint hypothesis: 
0 1 2 3: 0.H β β β β= = = =  
Then, we test whether the program impact along the poverty and the village 
marginality criteria is the same for all households by testing the following hypothesis: 
0 1 2 3: 0.H β β β= = =  
Rejecting this null hypothesis is evidence of heterogeneous program impacts 
along the program targeting criteria. In order to test whether the impacts are decreasing or 
increasing along the household poverty and village marginality indices, we examine the 
sign of the coefficients on the interaction terms in equation (1). We expect the sign of the 
coefficient on the interaction terms to be positive for the wealth, nutrition and education 
outcomes, and negative for children labor and domestic activities. We also estimate the 





2.4.2 Results and discussion 
Table 2.1 shows the estimation results for equation (1) for the wealth and nutrition 
variables.33 We reject the null hypothesis that the treatment does not vary with the 
targeting criteria for all outcomes and rounds. The rejection is stronger for the interaction 
with the village marginality index and weaker for the interaction with the poverty index. 
We find that the signs of the coefficients on the interaction terms are positive. This is 
evidence that the program impacts on wealth and nutrition are greater for those who 
initially live in the most remote villages. The coefficient on the interaction term between 
treatment and village marginality index decreases with time. The same holds for the 
coefficient on the interaction term between the treatment indicator and the two indices, 
which decreases with time. This means that the overall difference in program impacts 
between households who initially live in the most remote areas and those who initially 
live in the less marginal areas is getting smaller over time. Table 2.2 shows that the 
program has a significant impact on the wealth and nutrition aggregates in all rounds and 
that the fraction with a positive program impact on wealth and nutrition is also increasing 
over time. In the second and third round, the program impact on wealth and nutrition is 
positive for more than 90 percent of the treated group.  
Results from the impact of the program on time allocation outcomes for boys of 
primary school-age and secondary school-age are presented in Table 2.3. We do not find 
any program impact on schooling for primary school-age boys. The overall program 
impact on time spent in domestic chores is insignificant as well. Yet, the fraction of 
eligible young boys with a positive program impact on time spent in domestic activities is 
                                                 




unexpectedly high. We find evidence of a program impact on their labor activities. This 
impact varies with the program targeting criteria. The probability of participating in the 
labor market and time spent working is the lowest for the children who live in the most 
remote villages. Much of the variation in program impacts comes from the interaction 
with the village marginality index. Program impacts do not vary much with the initial 
poverty level of households. 
For secondary school-age boys, there is a significant program impact on both 
schooling and labor activities. The program does not have an impact on their domestic 
activities. We find evidence that the program impact on participation in school and time 
spent studying is smaller for children who live in the most remote villages. Furthermore, 
only 63 percent of eligible boys experience a positive impact on schooling time. This is 
not the expected finding. It is plausible that for the most remote villages, the decision to 
invest in education beyond primary school is less attractive than in less remote areas. We 
also find that participation in labor activities decreases more rapidly in the most remote 
areas than in the least remote areas for eligible households. Yet, the program impact on 
the time spent working does not vary with the targeting criteria. Nor do program impacts 
on any of the outcomes vary with the initial poverty level of households. 
Table 2.4 shows the program impacts on girls' time allocation outcomes. For 
primary school-age girls, the program impacts participation in domestic activities and 
time spent in domestic chores. But, the overall impact of the program on either schooling 
or labor is insignificant. We find evidence of variation of program impacts along the 
targeting criteria for the domestic activities of primary school-age girls. As expected, the 




that young girls from the most marginal areas are benefiting from a larger reduction in 
domestic activities because of the program than young girls from less marginal areas. 
Yet, the fraction of eligible young girls with a positive impact of the program on their 
domestic activities is unexpectedly high. Note also that program impacts do not vary with 
the initial poverty level of households.  
Finally, PROGRESA has a significant impact on schooling and domestic 
activities for secondary school-age girls. Program impacts on schooling vary with the 
targeting criteria, but program impacts on domestic chores are independent of the initial 
poverty and marginality indices. We find that the coefficient on the interaction between 
treatment and the poverty and marginality indices is negative for the participation in 
school equation of secondary school-age girls. The sign is also negative for the time spent 
studying. This is not the expected finding. This means that the program impact is smaller 
for poorest girls from the most remote villages.  
Overall, we find evidence that the program impacts vary with the program 
targeting criteria for most outcomes. In particular, program impacts depend on the initial 
place of living. We find that program impacts do not vary much with the initial poverty 
level of households. In an analysis of the PROGRESA program targeting, Skoufias et al. 
(2001) compare the current targeting mechanism to alternative selection models. They 
also find that program impacts could have been achieved using the geographic targeting 
alone. 34 As expected, we find that households from the most marginal villages get a 
greater program impact on wealth and nutrition than households from less marginal 
places. Similarly, children from the most remote villages are found to have a larger 




the program does not affect the schooling of primary school-age children. In addition, 
both secondary school-age boys and girls have a smaller program impact on their 
schooling time when they live in the most remote villages. Low impacts on schooling in 
the primary grades are consistent with the program spending money to “buy the base” 
(see Todd and Wolpin, 2003, for a similar finding). On average, secondary school-age 
children from the most remote areas may be getting a lower program impact because 
many of them chose not to attend school and thus do not get the PROGRESA grant.  
2.5 Heterogeneity of impacts and perfect positive dependence. 
The existing literature on heterogeneity of treatment effects mainly looks at the 
heterogeneous effect that vary with observed characteristics, i.e. the heterogeneity on 
subgroups of the population. In the case of PROGRESA, other papers found evidence of 
differential impacts on child’s schooling and labor for primary school-age children vs. 
secondary school-age children, for girls vs. boys, for drop-outs children vs. children 
continuing through school (see Skoufias 2001 for a synthesis of the results).  
In this section, we investigate the overall heterogeneity of program impacts, 
which includes both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. First, we quantify the total 
variance of impacts and test whether the total effect of the program is homogeneous over 
both observed and unobserved characteristics. Experimental data are sufficient to identify 
mean program impacts or impacts on subgroups, but do not identify unobserved 
heterogeneity in impacts. Second, we assume perfect positive dependence between 
untreated outcome levels and treated outcome levels in order to explore other 
distributional aspects of program impacts. Perfect positive dependence occurs when the 
                                                                                                                                                 




ranks of the households are unaffected by the program. This assumption means that a 
high (low) rank household in the untreated state remains a high (low) rank household 
after the treatment.  
2.5.1 Testing non-parametrically for heterogeneous program impacts 
The main issue in program evaluation is a problem of “missing data”. One cannot 
simultaneously observe the outcome of interest in the case of program participation (Y1) 
and in the case of non-participation to the program (Y0) for a given individual. Let T 
denote participation in the program, with T = 1 if a person participates and T = 0 
otherwise. Because localities are randomly assigned in treatment and control groups, the 
experiment provides information on the marginal distributions of the outcome, i.e. 
1 1( | 1)F y T = , the participants’ outcomes, and 0 0( | 1)F y T = , what the participants 
outcomes would have been had they participated (Heckman, Smith and Clements 1997). 
Although the joint distribution of outcomes is never observed, it can be bounded using 
classical probability inequalities due to Fréchet (1951) and Hoeffding (1940). Bounds for 
the correlation between Y1 and Y0 can be estimated, and thus the variance of the impact 
1 0Y Y∆ = −  can also be bounded using the Fréchet-Hoeffding inequalities.
35 One can then 
test whether the minimum variance is statistically different from zero. Rejecting this 
hypothesis implies that the program impact is heterogeneous for the population covered 
by the experiment. The Fréchet-Hoeffding bounds are as follows:  
1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0
[ ( | 1) ( | 1) 1,0)] ( , | 1)
                                                                [ ( | 1), ( | 1)].
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35 Cambanis et al. (1976) showed that if k (Y1, Y0) is superadditive (or subadditive) then the extreme values 




The upper-bound distribution corresponds to the case of perfect positive 
dependence between Y0 and Y1, i.e. the case for which the two marginal distributions are 
matched in ascending order. The lower-bound distribution in the Fréchet-Hoeffding 
inequalities corresponds to the case of perfect negative dependence, i.e. the case for 
which the marginal distributions are matched in the reverse order. Since the sample sizes 
of the treatment group and control group are different, we use the percentiles of each 
distribution. In each case, we calculate the outcomes correlation 
0 1Y Y
r  and derive the 
bounds for 
0 11 0 0 1
( ) ( ) var( ) 2 ( ) ( )Y YVar Var Y Y r Var Y Var Y∆ = + − . We then test whether the 
lower bound of the variance, which is derived from the Fréchet-Hoeffding upper-bound 
distribution, equals to zero. In the common effect model (homogeneous program 
impacts), the impact is constant and Var (∆) = 0. Thus, rejecting the null hypothesis that 
the lower bound of the variance is zero implies a rejection of the common effect model 
and provides evidence of heterogeneous program impacts, under the assumption of 
perfect positive dependence. In addition, the Fréchet-Hoeffding bounds give an estimate 
of the range of values for the variance of impacts. 
After decomposing the variance of impacts into the systematic variance of 
impacts along observable characteristics and the unobserved variance in impacts, we 
compute the Fréchet-Hoeffding bounds for the unobserved part of the variance in 
impacts. We test whether the lower bound of this variance is equal to zero. A rejection of 
this null hypothesis is further evidence of heterogeneous program impacts, not accounted 




2.5.2 A semi-parametric analysis 
The standard common effect estimator assumes that all treated households receive 
the same impact from the program. When comparing the distributions of the outcome 
variable for the treatment group and the control group, the treatment group distribution is 
only shifted by a constant factor. 36 We consider a model of heterogeneous impacts on the 
distribution that is estimated by quantile regression assuming the ranking property holds. 
The advantage of quantile regression is that the impact of the program on 
different quantiles of the outcome of interest does not have to be constant. Thus, the 
estimation of quantile treatment effects allows testing the hypothesis that the treatment 
effect is the same for all points of the initial distribution of the outcome by testing 
whether the impacts are the same across quantiles of the control distribution. 37  
Quantile treatment effects (QTE) are a special case of quantile regression of the 
conditional mean of  given Y X x=  where X is a discrete variable indicating whether the 
observation belongs to the treatment group or the control group. The quantile regression 
estimator minimizes a weighted sum of absolute residuals (Koenker and Bassett, 1978). 
Other experimental evaluations have used QTE, e.g. Heckman, Smith and Clements 
(1997), and Abadie, Angrist and Imbens (2002). 
We present the estimates of the QTE, which are impacts conditional on the 
percentiles of Y0 for the targeted outcomes: (1) wealth, proxied by the per capita value of 
consumption, (2) per capita value of food consumption. 38 The results on program 
                                                 
36 Note that the common effect model also assumes that household rankings with respect to the outcome of 
interest in the treated and untreated states are unaffected by the program. 
37 However, quantile treatment effects estimation does not provide information on the quantiles of the 
treatment effect distribution. 




impacts are estimated for November 1998, June 1999 and November 1999. Since the 
program started to send benefits in the summer 1998 and data on consumption is first 
collected in November 1998, the three cross-sections consist of post-program samples. 
Thus, we investigate quantile treatment effects in a simple difference model.  
Instead of estimating QTE on the outcomes Y, we also estimate QTE on Y , which 
are obtained by removing the effect of household characteristics X from the outcomes Y. 
Estimating QTE on Y  is similar to estimating experimental mean program impacts 
conditioned on X. Note that QTE estimation on Y and QTE estimation on Y  are both 
























In addition, we estimate QTE on Y  once systematic variation in impacts along 
program targeting criteria is removed. We compare the QTE unobserved heterogeneity in 
impacts with the QTE total heterogeneity in impacts. Do unobserved impacts vary along 
the percentiles of the untreated outcome in the same way as total impacts vary along the 
percentiles of the untreated outcome?  
What should we expect from the bounding and QTE analyses? Both the Fréchet-
Hoeffding lower bound of the variance of impacts and the QTE analysis correspond to 
the case of perfect positive dependence. The Fréchet-Hoeffding bounding analysis can 
inform us on the existence of heterogeneity in program impacts. The QTE estimation 
provides information on how the impact varies at different points of the untreated 




treatment effects also allows us to estimate the variance of impacts over the quantiles of 
the untreated outcome distribution, which should be close to the lower-bound of the 
variance estimated using the Fréchet-Hoeffding inequalities.  
Based on the theoretical framework, we expect the treatment effect on wealth and 
nutrition to be higher for the households whose cost of complying with the program 
requirements is the lower. In particular, children are required to attend school on a regular 
basis and their foregone earnings are an additional cost for households that relied on child 
labor before the start of the program. Whether unobserved treatment effects on wealth 
and nutrition follow this pattern is an open question. 
2.5.3 Results and discussion 
Table 2.5 provides evidence of the heterogeneity of program impacts on per 
capita expenditures, per capita value of consumption, per capita food expenditures and 
per capita value of food consumption using the Fréchet-Hoeffding inequalities. The 
standard errors are obtained from the bootstrap (Efron and Tibshirani, 1994). We find 
that program impacts standard deviations can range anywhere from 4 to 12 pesos 
(minimum) to 130 to 260 pesos (maximum). These values can be compared to the 
average monthly per capita cash transfer amount that eligible households are entitled to 
receive when they fulfill program requirements, i.e. 32 pesos. 39 The lower bound is 
substantively small compared to the average untreated outcome level (Table 2.5, last 
column). In all cases, we reject the null hypothesis that the minimum standard deviation 
is equal to zero at the 1% significance level. Using this non-parametric technique, we find 
that the experimental data are consistent with a large range of impact distributions. 
                                                 




In Table 2.2, we found that the systematic heterogeneity in impacts along the 
targeting criteria is significantly different from zero. Table 2.6 shows that the Fréchet-
Hoeffding lower bound unobserved impacts standard deviation is different from zero for 
all the outcomes considered and in all rounds. Thus, this is evidence that the 
heterogeneity in impacts found in Table 2.5 is not only due to the systematic 
heterogeneity along program targeting criteria.  
Figure 2-7 present the difference in quantiles from the two marginal distributions 
of the wealth and nutrition aggregates conditional on a set of observable characteristics 
for each round. The associated 90 percent pointwise confidence intervals are obtained 
from the bootstrap with 200 replications. Overall, the impacts are positive at each decile 
of the untreated distribution of outcomes.  
For both outcomes, the difference overall increases from the lowest percentile to 
the highest percentile of the control group distribution. It suggests the program impact on 
wealth and nutrition is lower for households who were at a lower level of wealth and 
nutrition prior to the intervention.  
In November 1998, the program impact on per capita value of consumption 
conditioned on X varies from about 4 pesos for the lowest decile of the untreated 
distribution to 8 pesos for the higher decile, i.e. increases by a factor two (Figure 2). This 
impact is low compared to the amount a PROGRESA household is eligible to receive 
upon compliance with program requirements. The impact at the median is about 7 pesos, 
compared to a mean impact of 8 pesos. This suggests that some households may not be 
getting the maximum benefit amount in November 1998, either because they have not 




In June 1999, the impact ranges from 9 pesos to 28 pesos, with a median at 19 
pesos and a mean at 17 pesos (Figure 3). Although the impact at the highest decile is 
close to the average per capita benefit amount, the impact at the first decile is still low. 
Thus, it is possible that the poorest households are still not getting the maximum benefit 
amount in June 1999. In November 1999, the impact ranges from 11 pesos to 22 pesos, 
with a median and mean at 16 pesos (Figure 4).  
The mean impact between November 1998 and November 1999 has increased by 
a factor two, while the impact at the lowest decile and the impact at the highest decile 
almost increased by a factor three in a year period. The impacts on per capita food 
consumption are similar in magnitude to the impacts of per capita consumption (Figures 
5-7). This suggests that PROGRESA affects household total consumption mainly through 
higher food consumption.  
Table 2.7 shows evidence of a variation in program impacts from the QTE 
analysis, except for the first round for which impacts are homogenous along the quantiles 
of the untreated distribution. In addition, Table 2.7 shows the program impact standard 
deviation from the QTE estimation. When the program impacts are found to be 
heterogeneous, impact standard deviations are similar to the lowest range of values 
estimated using the Fréchet-Hoeffding bounds.  
Results from the decomposition of program impacts into systematic impacts and 
unobserved impacts are given in Table 2.8. We find significant standard deviation in 
systematic impacts. Yet, the standard deviation of unobserved impacts is also 
significantly different from zero. Moreover, unobserved differences between the 




untreated outcome distribution except for the first round of data (Figures 8-13). This 
suggests that the variation in total impacts shown in Figures 2-7 are partly driven by the 
variation in the unobserved impacts.  
2.6 Heterogeneous program impacts under the assumption of independence 
between program impacts and untreated outcome levels 
In this section as in the previous section, we also investigate the overall 
heterogeneity of program impacts, which includes both observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity. In this section, the main assumption is that the untreated outcome levels 
and program impacts are independent. This assumption means that households do not 
anticipate gains from the program at the time they decide to participate in the program. 
This is likely to occur when households are randomly assigned to a treatment and a 
control group. How plausible is the assumption in the case of PROGRESA? In the 
Mexican program, random assignment is not at the household level but at the village 
level and treatment group households can choose not to fulfill program requirements. We 
test the independence assumption. When this assumption holds and under additional 
assumptions, we can plot the distribution of impacts.  
Note that if the independence assumption holds, then program impacts should not 
vary along the quantiles of the untreated distribution. Yet, since program impacts are 
found to vary with the untreated distribution, the QTE results imply that the assumption 
of independence between program impacts and the untreated outcome levels does not 
hold. Yet, if the assumption of perfect positive dependence does not hold, then the 




2.6.1 The Hildreth-Houck random coefficient model 
As previously, denote by 0Y  the outcome in the untreated state, and 1Y  the 
outcome in the treated state. Any individual can only be observed in one or the other 
state. The observed outcome Y  is a function of 0Y , 1Y  and the treatment indicator T. 
Suppose that the treatment effect varies for each household. We denote the household-
specific program impacts by iβ . We assume that program impacts and untreated outcome 
levels Y0 are uncorrelated. We have: 
(2) 0 1 0 1 0(1 ) ( ).i i i i i i i i iY T Y T Y Y T Y Y= − + = + −  
Denote by 0̂Y  the expected outcome for the control group given a vector of 
individual characteristics X, i.e. : 
0̂ ( | , 0).Y E Y X T= =  
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where β is the mean treatment effect, 0iν and 1iν  are respectively the individual 
deviations of 0iY  and of 1iY  with respect to their means. 
Thus, we have from equation (2): 
0 1 0 0
ˆ ( ( )) .i i i i iY Y T v v vβ= + + − +  
The household-specific program impacts iβ  are as follows: 
1 0( ).i i iv vβ β= + −  




E( ) , .i i iβ β β β σ= = +  
We assume that 0E( ) 0, E( ) 0.i iσ ν= =  
Equation (2) becomes: 
(3) 0 0ˆ .i i i iY Y T β ν= + +  
Equation (3) has the structure of the Hildreth-Houck random coefficient model 
(1968). The independence between program impacts and untreated outcome levels 
implies that iσ are independent of 0iν . 
0Let . i i i iTε σ ν= + Then equation (3) can be written as follows: 
0̂ .i i iY Y T β ε= + +  
The Hildreth-Houck model is a heteroscedastic error structure model: 
0
0
( | 0) ( ),
( | 1) ( ).
i i i








Under the assumption that iσ and 0iν  are uncorrelated, we have: 
0 0( )= ( ) ( ).i i i iVar Var Varσ ν σ ν+ +  
Once we assume that program impacts and the untreated outcome levels are 
independent, testing for heterogeneous program effect consists in testing that the variance 
of the error term depends on whether the household belongs to the treatment or the 
control group. This is done using the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity and the 
LR test for groupwise heteroscedasticity (Judge et al. 1985). We treat the existence of 
negative values for i0 0( ( + ) - ( ))i iVar Varσ ν ν  as a test of the assumption of independence 




in the variance of the OLS residuals for the treatment and the control groups. Under the 
assumptions of the random coefficient model, this difference should represent the 
variance of impacts. 
In addition, we estimate the standard deviation of impacts when impacts are 
decomposed into systematic impacts and unobserved impacts. Finding significant impacts 
along observable characteristics that are correlated with the untreated outcome is 
evidence that the independence assumption is false for the population as a whole. We 
provide estimates of the standard deviation of total and unobserved impacts under the less 
restrictive assumption that 0 | ,iY Z T Zβ⊥ × .  
2.6.2 Additional assumptions on the distribution of program impacts 
If we assume that the impacts are normally distributed, then the estimation of the 
mean and variance of impacts is sufficient to plot the distribution of impacts. It also 
allows us to compute the percentage of the treated population that experienced a positive 
impact from the program.  
Alternatively, we assume that the distribution of program impacts belongs to the 
Pearson family of distributions. This family of distributions includes as special cases the 
normal, chi-square, beta and gamma distributions. It only allows for one mode but 
includes bell curve shapes, as well as J-shaped or U-shaped curves (Kendall and Stuart, 
1963). From the theoretical model that assumes that untreated outcome levels and gains 
from the program are uncorrelated, we have: 0 1 .i i iY Yβ+ =  
Since we assume that 0iY  and iβ  are uncorrelated, we can estimate by 




the distribution of 1Y and the moments of the distribution of 0Y .
40 Note that the estimation 
of the four moment of the distribution of impacts by deconvolution allows to further test 
the independence assumption. Finding a negative value for the estimated fourth moment 
is an indication of failure of the independence assumption. The first four moments are 
then used to approximate the distribution of impacts, assuming that it belongs to the 
Pearson family of distributions (see also Biddle, Boden and Reville 2003 who 
approximate the distribution of the effects of work-related injury on the subsequent 
earnings by a Pearson distribution). Using the estimated first four moments, we test 
whether the estimated distribution exists. It can be shown that all frequency distributions 
satisfy the following relation between the second moment about the mean 2µ , the third 












= =  
Rejection is interpreted as a failure of the independence assumption. When the 
independence assumption is not rejected, this method allows us to obtain a density 
function for the distribution of impacts from the Pearson family of distributions.  
2.6.3 Results and discussion 
All outcomes previously analyzed are per capita measures. We also estimate the 
random coefficient model using per capita outcomes although we do not report the 
estimates. 41 For per capita measures of wealth and nutrition, we find negative value for 
                                                 
40 The derivation of the first four moments from deconvolution are in Appendix 4. 




the estimated i0 0( ( + ) - ( ))i iVar Varσ ν ν . Thus, we reject the assumption of independence 
between program impacts and untreated outcome levels for per capita measures. These 
results are consistent with the variation in impacts along the quantiles of the untreated 
distribution found from the QTE analysis under the assumption of perfect positive 
dependence. 
In Table 2.9, we present tests of heterogeneity in the variance of the error term 
using the Hildreth-Houck random coefficient model for household total wealth and 
nutrition outcomes. The first column in Table 2.9 provides the Breusch-Pagan test results 
and the second column provides the LR test for groupwise heteroscedasticity results. The 
results are consistent in both columns. We reject the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity 
in most cases. As in the case of the semi-parametric estimation, rejection is less frequent 
when using the first round of post-program data. The third column of Table 2.9 show the 
estimated standard deviation of impacts associated with a standard error. The estimated 
standard deviation of impacts is higher in the second round. The program impacts 
standard deviations vary from 31 to 178 pesos for household wealth and from 50 to 150 
pesos for nutrition. Recall that these impacts concern household outcome levels and 
therefore cannot be directly compared to the impacts on per capita outcomes that are 
reported in the previous analyses. Yet, they can be compared to the average monthly 
benefit that a household is untitled to receive upon compliance with program 
requirements, i.e. about 200 pesos.  
Using the estimated mean and variance of impacts and assuming a normal 
distribution, we plot the distribution of impacts on household consumption (Figure 14) 




percentage of the treated population with a positive impact ranges from 63% to 81%. It is 
higher for the latest rounds. If we believe that the normality assumption holds, then this 
finding suggest that, in the first round, household may have supported the cost of the 
program requirements without receiving the program benefits because of implementation 
problems. Recall that in the empirical section, we consider the effect of the offer to treat 
which is likely to be a lower bound for the effect of the program on the treated population 
because some households may not be getting the program benefits.  
In Table 2.10, we show the standard deviation of impacts in the case of the less 
restrictive independence assumption, i.e. when impacts are allowed to vary along the 
targeting criteria. The systematic standard deviation of impacts and the unobserved 
deviation of impacts sums up to the total standard deviation of impacts under the 
assumption that 0 | ,iY Z T Zβ⊥ × . The total standard deviation of impacts in Table 2.10 is 
larger than the standard deviation of impacts in Table 2.9, which is derived under the 
stronger independence assumption 0 iY β⊥ . When we assume that impacts follow a 
normal distribution, we find that 56% to 74% of the eligible households experience a 
positive impact under the weaker assumption that 0 | ,iY Z T Zβ⊥ × . This is always lower 
than the percentage with a positive impact under the stronger independence assumption. 
We estimate the first four moments of the distribution of impacts. We find 
negative values for the estimated fourth moment for many of the outcomes, except 
consumption in November 1998 and November 1999, food expenditures in November 
1998 and November 1999 and food consumption in November 1999. This result is 
interpreted as a failure of the independence assumption. Furthermore, the first four 




frequency distribution. Thus, we are left with estimating Pearson distributions for the 
program impacts on four of the outcome variables. Yet, the third column in Table 2.9 
shows that the standard deviation is not significantly different from zero for one of these 
four outcomes, i.e. November 1998 consumption. 
We find that for three of the four outcomes, i.e. November 1998 consumption, 
June 1999 food expenditures and November 1999 food consumption, the distribution of 
impacts is approximated by an L-shaped Gamma distribution (Figures 16, 18 and 19). 
First, this shape is clearly not similar to that of a normal distribution as assumed in Figure 
14 and 15, although both shapes belong to the Pearson family. Second, all households 
have a positive program impacts on consumption and food consumption and 
expenditures. Third, these distributions of impacts have a vertical asymptote at less than 
100 pesos. Most of the households have a small program impact and a few households 
have a large impact. Finally, the distribution of impacts on November 1999 consumption 
is approximated by a Type IV Pearson distribution (Figure 17). This distribution is less 
skewed than the estimated Gamma distribution for the other outcomes. Moreover, about 
30 % of the population experienced negative impacts. 
Failure of the independence assumption for most of the outcomes of interest cast 
doubt on the validity of the independence assumption. Some eligible households are 
likely to choose not to comply with the children school attendance requirement although 
they would still receive the food cash transfer. Thus, failure of the independence 
assumption is consistent with selective compliance to program requirements of the 





In this paper, we assess the importance of heterogeneity in impacts from the 
PROGRESA program. The PROGRESA experimental data help measure the effect of the 
“offer to treat”. This commonly used experimental estimator under-estimates the value of 
the mean program impact for those who actually take-up program benefits. Finding a 
positive value is sufficient evidence that the program works.  
Yet, we find evidence that program impacts are not uniformly distributed in the 
treated population as do Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997), Abadie, Angrist and 
Imbens (2002), Black, Smith, Berger and Noel (2003), Biddle, Boden and Reville (2003), 
Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes (2004) for different treatment effects in the US context.  
Theoretical predictions based on the PROGRESA benefit scheme indicate that 
program impacts on wealth and nutrition are higher for households whose cost of 
complying with program requirements is lower. Program impacts on education are higher 
when the conditionality of program is binding. The conditionality of the program can also 
drive some households to take-up only parts of the program benefits, which leads to 
heterogeneity in impacts. In addition, program impacts on welfare are likely to be small 
or even negative because of failures in the implementation of the program.  
First, we find evidence that the program selection mechanism is only partially 
effective in capturing the heterogeneity in program impacts. The geographic targeting is 
effective but we find little if any benefit from targeting within the poor villages. The 
proportion of beneficiaries with a positive program impact on wealth and nutrition ranges 
from 63% to 99% depending on the outcome considered. This proportion is the lowest in 




some households may have bear the cost of complying without receiving the benefits 
because of early implementation delays in sending the cash transfers. We also find that 
secondary school-age children from the most remote areas get the lowest program 
impact. This is consistent with the fact that many of them may have chosen not to attend 
school and do not get the PROGRESA grant. 
Second, we investigate the overall heterogeneity of program impacts, which 
includes both unobserved and systematic heterogeneity. Methodologically, experimental 
data help identify subgroups effects such as heterogeneity along the targeting criteria, but 
do not directly identify unobserved heterogeneity in impacts. Using the Fréchet-
Hoeffding inequalities from classical probability theory, we find evidence against the 
homogeneous impact assumption underlying most of the impact evaluation research as do 
Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997). This result does not rely on any assumption and 
thus is particularly strong evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects. We also find 
evidence of heterogeneity in program impacts, which is not due to systematic variation 
along observable characteristics. Yet, many distributions of impacts are consistent the 
estimated variance of impacts from the bounding analysis. 
Additional assumptions are required to analyze the distribution of impacts. We 
consider two assumptions. The first one concerns perfect positive dependence between 
potential outcomes in the treatment and non-treatment state. The second relates to 
whether program participants anticipate the gains from the program. The second 
assumption is that program impacts and untreated outcome levels are independent.  
First, we estimate distribution of program impacts along the quantiles of the 




find that program impacts on wealth and nutrition are greater for the households who 
were at a higher level of wealth and nutrition prior to the intervention. We also find that 
the variation in total impacts along the quantiles of the untreated distribution are partly 
driven by the variation in the unobserved impacts along the quantiles of the untreated 
distribution. Second, we reject the independence assumption for most of the outcomes. 
This is consistent with a selective take-up of specific program component in the eligible 
population, as predicted in the analysis of the conditionality of the program. Yet, we 
estimate the full distribution of impacts for the outcomes for which the independence 
assumption holds, assuming it belongs to the flexible Pearson family of distributions. 
Most of the distributions are L-shaped, which means that most of the families get a small 





Appendix 1: Tables of chapter 1 
Table 1.1: Variables in the PROGRESA sample. 
Unit of observation Variable 
Individual and household level Household composition, education, health, 
paid and non-paid labor, farm activities, 
income, expenditures, living conditions, 
assets, decision-making within the 
household. 
Locality level Availability of services, main economic 
activities, all prices (including wages) 
Module on the status of women and 
intrahousehold relations 
Assets at marriage of the spouses, 
education of their parents and wealth of 





Table 1.2: Partition of households in the restricted sample between eligible / non-
eligible and treatment / control groups. 
 Treatment localities Control localities Total 





No transfer until 






























# of Obs. Mean S.D. 
=1 if treatment group treated 9223 0.63 0.48 
P.C. calorie consumption  pcc 8319 2072 869 
P.C. value of consumption pce 9028 181 107 
P.C. family income pcy 9136 201 122 
P.C. calorie consumption from vegetables and 
fruits 
pccveg 9184 41 36 
P.C. calorie consumption from grains and 
cereals 
pccgrn 9048 1612 949 
P.C. calorie consumption from meat and meat 
products 
pccmea 9178 109 121 
P.C. calorie consumption from other food pccotf 9176 329 178 
=1 if wife earns any non-labor income anywny 9223 0.62 0.49 
=1 if wife earns any labor income  anywly 9223 0.05 0.22 
=1 if wife earns any income  anywty 9223 0.64 0.48 
=1 if husband earns any non-labor income anyhny 9223 0.34 0.47 
=1 if husband earns any labor income  anyhly 9223 0.88 0.32 
=1 if husband earns any income  anyhty 9223 0.97 0.17 
# of household income earners other than 
heads 
Nosce 9223 0.41 0.76 
Wife’s non-labor income if any wnonlaby 5719 140 114 
Wife’s labor income if any wlaby 451 711 392 
Wife’s total income if any wty 5873 190 233 
Husband’s non-labor income if any hnonlaby 3135 151 243 
Husband’s labor income if any hlaby 8159 853 343 
Husband’s total income of any hty 8955 826 389 
=1 if house floor made of cement  cement 9223 0.26 0.44 
=1 if house has access to piped water  pipes 9223 0.28 0.45 
=1 if wife lives in the same village as she 
lived in before her marriage  
sameloc 8053 0.64 0.48 
=1 if husband’s father wore shoes at the time 
of marriage  
f2shoes 8053 0.61 0.49 
=1 if husband’s father had some primary 
school education  
f2sprim 8053 0.29 0.45 
=1 if husband’s mother had some primary 
school education  
m2sprim 8053 0.20 0.40 
=1 if wife’s father wore shoes at the time of 
marriage  
fshoes 8053 0.61 0.49 
=1 if wife’s father had some primary school 
education  
fsprim 8053 0.36 0.48 
=1 if husband own a house at the time of 
marriage  




Table 1.3: continued 
 
Variable description Variable 
name 
# of Obs. Mean S.D. 
# of household members  hhsz 9221 6.60 2.53 
# of children below age 4  ch4 9223 1.15 1.11 
# of children 5-10  ch510 9223 1.44 1.15 
# of boys 11-14  m1114 9223 0.42 0.64 
# of girls 11-14 f1114 9223 0.40 0.62 
# of boys 15-19 m1519 9223 0.35 0.62 
# of girls 15-19 f1519 9223 0.35 0.61 
# of men 20-34 m2034 9223 0.51 0.57 
# of women 20-34 f2034 9223 0.62 0.58 
# of men 35-54 m3554 9223 0.50 0.51 
# of women 35-54 f3554 9223 0.46 0.51 
# of men 55 or more m55p 9223 0.19 0.40 
# of women 55 or more f55p 9223 0.17 0.40 
Husband’s # of years of schooling  h_edu 9223 2.93 2.64 
Wife’s # of years of schooling  w_edu 9223 2.74 2.68 
=1 if husband’s an ag-worker agworker 9223 0.74 0.44 
=1 if village has access to electricity elec 9223 0.66 0.47 
=1 if village has a sewage system sewage 9223 0.12 0.33 
=1 if some permanent health care facilities 
in the village  
healthf 9223 0.84 0.36 
=1 if mobile health squad in the village  mobilehf 9223 0.80 0.40 
Median local price per kg of tomatoes  mp_tom 9223 10.7 1.5 
Median local price per kg of onions mp_on 9223 7.0 1.5 
Median local price per kg of potatoes mp_pot 9223 7.2 1.6 
Median local price per kg of oranges mp_orng 9223 3.6 3.1 
Median local price per kg of plantains mp_plat 9223 3.4 1.0 
Median local price per kg of maize tortillas mp_tort 9223 3.4 0.7 
Median local price per kg of corn mp_corn 9223 3.0 0.8 
Median local price per kg of noodles mp_ndle 9223 2.2 0.6 
Median local price per kg of rice mp_rice 9223 6.6 1.1 
Median local price per kg of beans mp_bean 9223 11.2 2.0 
Median local price per kg of chicken mp_chic 9223 21.6 3.5 
Median local price per kg of eggs mp_egg 9223 10.3 1.8 
Median local price per kg of coffee mp_cof 9223 10.0 3.0 
 









Table 1.4: Changes in the number of earners in the longitudinal data. 
 
Number of earners: From November 1998 to June 
1999 
From June 1999 to November 
1999 
Did not change 48% 48% 
Increased 19% 36% 





Table 1.5: Descriptive statistics for the longitudinal sample. 
 
Variable description Name N Mean S.D. 
Change in log. Of per mouth calories consumption  clpcc 36732 -0.016 0.61
Change in log. Of per capita value of consumption clpce 36786 -0.011 0.58
Change in the # of household members who earn income cnearners 38389 0.095 0.89
Change in the # of male earners in the household cnmearners 38389 0.046 0.77
Change in the # of female earners in the household Cnfearners 38389 0.050 0.46
# of household members who stopped earning income Ndrop 38389 0.248 0.52
# of household members who started earning income Nenter 38389 0.343 0.59
# of female household members who stopped earning 
income 
Nfdrop 38389 0.082 0.27
# of female household members who started earning income Nfenter 38389 0.132 0.34
# of male household members who stopped earning income Nmdrop 38389 0.179 0.38
# of male household members who started earning income Nmenter 38389 0.214 0.41
Change in household size chhsz 38389 -0.040 0.44
Change in the # of children below age 4 cch4 38389 -0.036 0.44
Change in the # of children age 5 to 10 cch510 38389 -0.011 0.41
Change in the # of males age 11 to 14 cm1114 38389 0.005 0.30
Change in the # of females age 11 to 14 cf1114 38389 0.003 0.30
Change in the # of males age 15 to 19 cm1519 38389 -0.009 0.32
Change in the # of females age 15 to 19 cf1519 38389 -0.017 0.35
Change in the # of males age 20 to 34 cm2034 38389 -0.026 0.33
Change in the # of females age 20 to 34 cf2034 38389 -0.018 0.31
Change in the # of males age 35 to 54 cm3554 38389 -0.002 0.22
Change in the # of females age 35 to 54 cf3554 38389 0.003 0.22
Change in the # of males age 55 or more cm55p 38389 0.003 0.18
Change in the # of females age 55 or more Cf55p 38389 0.003 0.18
Per capita calorie consumption  pcc 37655 2263 1080
Per capita value of consumption pce 37646 201 126 
Per capita household income pcy 34556 246 162 
# of household income earners nearners 38389 1.6 0.8 
# of male household income earners nmearners 38389 1.1 0.7 
# of female household income earners nfearners 38389 0.6 0.6 
# of household members hhsz 38383 5.8 2.7 
=1 if treatment group treated 38389 0.61 0.48
Number of males age 20 to 34 m2034 38389 0.5 0.6 
Number of female age 20 to 34 f2034 38389 0.5 0.6 
Number of males age 15 to 19 m1519 38389 0.4 0.6 
Number of females age 15 to 19 f1519 38389 0.3 0.6 
 
Note: Changes relates to the period between November 1998 and June 1999, and the 
period between June 1999 and November 1999. Descriptive statistics for the variables in 




Table 1.6: 2SLS estimation of the unitary model - lpce instrumented using lpcy. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lpcc lpccveg lpccgrn lpccmea lpccotf 
lpce 0.319*** 1.590*** 0.248** 1.200*** 0.214* 
 (0.080) (0.235) (0.120) (0.239) (0.129) 
lhhsz -0.159*** 0.469*** -0.144* 0.221 -0.592*** 
 (0.055) (0.159) (0.086) (0.172) (0.088) 
ch4 0.009 0.016 -0.001 0.007 0.021** 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) 
ch510 -0.001 -0.020 -0.012 -0.013 -0.008 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) 
m1114 0.023** -0.070*** 0.020 -0.027 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.023) (0.013) (0.024) (0.014) 
f1114 0.020** -0.080*** 0.024* -0.023 0.023* 
 (0.009) (0.022) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) 
m1519 0.013 -0.054** 0.010 -0.021 0.021 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.012) (0.023) (0.013) 
f1519 0.013 0.009 0.005 0.019 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.012) (0.021) (0.013) 
m2034 0.024** -0.056** 0.028* -0.038 0.027* 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.014) (0.026) (0.015) 
f2034 0.001 -0.026 0.002 -0.045* 0.022 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.015) (0.026) (0.014) 
m3554 0.012 -0.087*** 0.015 -0.065* 0.028 
 (0.013) (0.033) (0.019) (0.033) (0.019) 
f3554 0.011 -0.023 0.014 -0.002 0.033* 
 (0.012) (0.030) (0.017) (0.030) (0.018) 
m55p 0.011 -0.056 0.001 0.015 0.018 
 (0.014) (0.035) (0.020) (0.035) (0.021) 
f55p 0.014 0.004 0.007 0.002 0.024 
 (0.012) (0.030) (0.018) (0.031) (0.017) 
h_edu -0.008*** 0.005 -0.013*** -0.004 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
w_edu -0.007*** -0.003 -0.010*** 0.005 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
agworker 0.009 -0.028 0.021 -0.024 0.006 
 (0.010) (0.028) (0.015) (0.028) (0.017) 
elec -0.039*** -0.005 -0.048*** -0.025 -0.037*** 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.013) (0.021) (0.013) 
sewage -0.019 -0.008 -0.029 -0.005 0.044** 
 (0.013) (0.032) (0.020) (0.032) (0.017) 
healthf 0.008 -0.017 0.002 0.016 -0.001 
 (0.014) (0.038) (0.022) (0.040) (0.022) 
mobilehf 0.007 -0.062** 0.022 -0.010 0.003 
  (0.010) (0.025) (0.014) (0.025) (0.016) 
mp_tom -0.002 -0.022** -0.001 -0.030*** 0.019*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) 
mp_on 0.002 -0.006 0.003 0.011 -0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) 
mp_pot 0.013*** -0.001 0.016*** 0.006 0.010** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
mp_orng -0.011*** 0.012*** -0.017*** -0.001 0.003 






Table 1.6: continued 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lpcc lpccveg lpccgrn lpccmea lpccotf 
mp_plat -0.005 -0.012 -0.009 -0.008 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) 
mp_tort 0.008 -0.027** 0.006 -0.006 0.039*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) 
mp_corn 0.028*** 0.061*** 0.029*** 0.033** 0.034*** 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.010) (0.016) (0.011) 
mp_ndle 0.002 0.050*** -0.010 0.082*** -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.019) (0.011) (0.025) (0.012) 
mp_rice -0.011*** 0.005 -0.012** -0.031*** 0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
mp_bean 0.002 -0.001 0.009*** -0.033*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
mp_chic -0.005*** -0.006* -0.004*** 0.009*** -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
mp_egg 0.001 -0.019*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) 
mp_cof -0.004** -0.002 -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Constant 6.268*** -4.848*** 6.274*** -1.384 5.154*** 
 (0.508) (1.492) (0.768) (1.552) (0.819) 
Observ. 8163 8657 8794 8196 8816 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  




Table 1.7: 2SLS estimation of the unitary model - lpce is instrumented using 
dwelling characteristics. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lpcc lpccveg lpccgrn lpccmea lpccotf 
lpce 0.277*** 1.389*** 0.232*** 1.392*** 0.183** 
 (0.060) (0.136) (0.085) (0.156) (0.089) 
lhhsz -0.189*** 0.341*** -0.170** 0.324** -0.609*** 
 (0.046) (0.112) (0.070) (0.129) (0.071) 
ch4 0.010 0.012 0.001 0.016 0.020** 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) 
ch510 0.001 -0.021 -0.010 -0.007 -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) 
m1114 0.027*** -0.059*** 0.023* -0.030 0.009 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) 
f1114 0.023*** -0.075*** 0.027** -0.025 0.023* 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) 
m1519 0.014* -0.049** 0.012 -0.025 0.021* 
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) 
f1519 0.013 0.013 0.005 0.016 -0.005 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012) 
m2034 0.026*** -0.053** 0.030** -0.040 0.030** 
 (0.010) (0.024) (0.014) (0.025) (0.015) 
f2034 0.002 -0.020 0.005 -0.052** 0.022 
 (0.010) (0.024) (0.015) (0.026) (0.014) 
m3554 0.016 -0.080** 0.019 -0.073** 0.033* 
 (0.013) (0.031) (0.019) (0.033) (0.019) 
f3554 0.013 -0.019 0.016 -0.001 0.032* 
 (0.012) (0.028) (0.017) (0.031) (0.018) 
m55p 0.016 -0.049 0.006 0.009 0.021 
 (0.014) (0.033) (0.020) (0.035) (0.020) 
f55p 0.013 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.022 
 (0.012) (0.029) (0.018) (0.031) (0.017) 
h_edu -0.008*** 0.005 -0.013*** -0.005 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
w_edu -0.007*** -0.002 -0.010*** 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
agworker 0.006 -0.041* 0.019 -0.007 0.004 
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.014) (0.025) (0.015) 
elec -0.035*** -0.004 -0.045*** -0.033 -0.034*** 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) 
sewage -0.017 0.005 -0.028 -0.012 0.045*** 
 (0.013) (0.029) (0.019) (0.030) (0.016) 
healthf 0.005 -0.042 0.001 0.035 -0.003 
 (0.013) (0.028) (0.019) (0.032) (0.019) 
mobilehf 0.008 -0.055** 0.022 -0.014 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.014) (0.025) (0.015) 
mp_tom -0.003 -0.028*** -0.001 -0.025*** 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) 
mp_on 0.002 -0.008 0.002 0.016** -0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
mp_pot 0.013*** 0.001 0.016*** 0.003 0.010** 






Table 1.7: continued. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lpcc lpccveg lpccgrn lpccmea lpccotf 
mp_orng -0.012*** 0.009** -0.018*** 0.001 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
mp_plat -0.005 -0.011 -0.009 -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) 
mp_tort 0.008 -0.026** 0.005 -0.006 0.040*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) 
mp_corn 0.029*** 0.065*** 0.029*** 0.026* 0.034*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) 
mp_ndle 0.004 0.052*** -0.009 0.079*** -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.018) (0.010) (0.025) (0.011) 
mp_rice -0.011*** 0.004 -0.012** -0.033*** 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
mp_bean 0.002 -0.001 0.009*** -0.034*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
mp_chic -0.005*** -0.005 -0.005*** 0.009*** -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
mp_egg 0.001 -0.020*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
mp_cof -0.004*** -0.003 -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Constant 6.533*** -3.554*** 6.390*** -2.604** 5.346*** 
 (0.386) (0.870) (0.547) (1.014) (0.571) 
Observ. 8231 8728 8875 8268 8890 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 





Table 1.8: 2SLS estimation of the unitary model - lpce is instrumented using lpcy 
and dwelling characteristics. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lpcc lpccveg lpccgrn lpccmea lpccotf 
lpce 0.294*** 1.457*** 0.240*** 1.354*** 0.191*** 
 (0.049) (0.121) (0.070) (0.132) (0.073) 
lhhsz -0.172*** 0.393*** -0.149** 0.316*** -0.605*** 
 (0.042) (0.107) (0.064) (0.120) (0.065) 
ch4 0.009 0.012 -0.001 0.011 0.020** 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) 
ch510 -0.001 -0.021 -0.012 -0.012 -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) 
m1114 0.024*** -0.065*** 0.021 -0.033 0.009 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) 
f1114 0.020** -0.077*** 0.025** -0.027 0.023* 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) 
m1519 0.013 -0.052** 0.010 -0.025 0.021* 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) 
f1519 0.013 0.011 0.005 0.016 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.012) (0.021) (0.013) 
m2034 0.024** -0.053** 0.028* -0.042 0.028* 
 (0.010) (0.024) (0.014) (0.026) (0.015) 
f2034 0.001 -0.024 0.003 -0.050* 0.022 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.015) (0.026) (0.014) 
m3554 0.013 -0.081*** 0.016 -0.072** 0.029 
 (0.013) (0.031) (0.019) (0.033) (0.019) 
f3554 0.011 -0.022 0.014 -0.004 0.033* 
 (0.012) (0.029) (0.017) (0.031) (0.018) 
m55p 0.012 -0.050 0.001 0.008 0.019 
 (0.014) (0.033) (0.020) (0.035) (0.020) 
f55p 0.013 0.001 0.007 0.002 0.024 
 (0.012) (0.030) (0.018) (0.031) (0.017) 
h_edu -0.008*** 0.005 -0.013*** -0.004 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
w_edu -0.007*** -0.002 -0.010*** 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
agworker 0.007 -0.038* 0.021 -0.014 0.004 
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.014) (0.024) (0.014) 
elec -0.038*** -0.003 -0.048*** -0.028 -0.037*** 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) 
sewage -0.017 -0.001 -0.029 -0.014 0.046*** 
 (0.012) (0.029) (0.019) (0.030) (0.016) 
healthf 0.005 -0.033 0.001 0.035 -0.003 
 (0.012) (0.028) (0.018) (0.031) (0.018) 
mobilehf 0.008 -0.056** 0.022 -0.015 0.003 
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.014) (0.024) (0.015) 
mp_tom -0.003 -0.026*** -0.001 -0.026*** 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
mp_on 0.002 -0.008 0.002 0.014* -0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
mp_pot 0.013*** 0.001 0.016*** 0.004 0.010** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
mp_orng -0.012*** 0.010*** -0.017*** 0.001 0.003 





Table 1.8: continued. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lpcc lpccveg lpccgrn lpccmea lpccotf 
mp_plat -0.005 -0.012 -0.009 -0.007 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) 
mp_tort 0.008 -0.027** 0.006 -0.006 0.039*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) 
mp_corn 0.029*** 0.064*** 0.029*** 0.028* 0.035*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) 
mp_ndle 0.003 0.054*** -0.010 0.078*** -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.018) (0.010) (0.024) (0.011) 
mp_rice -0.011*** 0.005 -0.012** -0.031*** 0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
mp_bean 0.002 -0.001 0.009*** -0.033*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
mp_chic -0.005*** -0.005 -0.004*** 0.009** -0.012*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
mp_egg 0.001 -0.020*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
mp_cof -0.004*** -0.003 -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Constant 6.421*** -4.011*** 6.328*** -2.378*** 5.300*** 
 (0.313) (0.774) (0.455) (0.868) (0.474) 
Observ. 8163 8657 8794 8196 8816 














Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 





Table 1.9: First stage regression in the case of the unitary model. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 lpce lpce lpce 
lpcy 0.082***  0.078*** 
 (0.009)  (0.009) 
pipes  0.042*** 0.042*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) 
cement  0.140*** 0.138*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) 
lhhsz -0.523*** -0.626*** -0.556*** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
ch4 -0.025*** -0.020** -0.020** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
ch510 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
m1114 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
f1114 0.027** 0.027** 0.025** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
m1519 0.004 0.025** 0.007 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
f1519 0.008 0.015 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
m2034 0.005 0.029** 0.012 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
f2034 0.022* 0.024** 0.020 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
m3554 0.029* 0.052*** 0.037** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
f3554 0.012 0.017 0.014 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
m55p 0.029* 0.047*** 0.033** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
f55p -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
h_edu 0.003 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
w_edu 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
agworker -0.081*** -0.060*** -0.073*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
elec 0.016 0.008 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
sewage 0.065*** 0.060*** 0.056*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
healthf -0.112*** -0.109*** -0.098*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
mobilehf 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.029** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
mp_tom -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
mp_on -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.012*** 






Table 1.9: continued. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 lpce lpce lpce 
mp_pot 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
mp_orng -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
mp_plat -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
mp_tort -0.006 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
mp_corn 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
mp_ndle 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.028*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
mp_rice -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
mp_bean 0.001 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
mp_chic 0.004*** 0.003** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
mp_egg -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
mp_cof -0.004** -0.003* -0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 5.812*** 6.284*** 5.781*** 
 (0.100) (0.078) (0.099) 
Observations 8947 9028 8947 
R-squared 0.25 0.26 0.26 
F-test: 
IVs jointly significant 
75.26 96.55 89.21 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 









P.C. calorie consumption 13.11 
(0.0003) 
P.C. calorie consumption from vegetables and fruits 8.46 
(0.0036) 
P.C. calorie consumption from grains and cereals 14.29 
(0.0001) 
P.C. calorie consumption from meat and meat products 0.09 
(0.75) 






Table 1.11: 2SLS estimation of the restricted collective model. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lpcc lpccveg lpccgrn lpccmea lpccotf 
lpce 0.278*** 1.428*** 0.214*** 1.364*** 0.174** 
 (0.050) (0.123) (0.073) (0.135) (0.075) 
lwnonlaby 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.011*** -0.002 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
lhhsz -0.182*** 0.375*** -0.165** 0.323*** -0.616*** 
 (0.043) (0.107) (0.065) (0.121) (0.065) 
ch4 0.008 0.012 -0.002 0.012 0.020** 
 (0.006) (0.015) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) 
ch510 -0.001 -0.022 -0.013 -0.012 -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.010) (0.017) (0.011) 
m1114 0.024*** -0.065*** 0.021 -0.033 0.009 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) 
f1114 0.021** -0.077*** 0.025** -0.027 0.023* 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.013) (0.022) (0.013) 
m1519 0.013 -0.053** 0.010 -0.025 0.021 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) 
f1519 0.013 0.011 0.005 0.016 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.012) (0.021) (0.013) 
m2034 0.024** -0.054** 0.027* -0.042 0.027* 
 (0.010) (0.024) (0.014) (0.026) (0.015) 
f2034 0.003 -0.020 0.006 -0.050* 0.025* 
 (0.010) (0.024) (0.015) (0.026) (0.014) 
m3554 0.014 -0.080** 0.017 -0.072** 0.030 
 (0.013) (0.031) (0.019) (0.033) (0.019) 
f3554 0.012 -0.021 0.015 -0.005 0.034* 
 (0.012) (0.029) (0.017) (0.031) (0.018) 
m55p 0.013 -0.049 0.002 0.008 0.020 
 (0.014) (0.033) (0.020) (0.035) (0.020) 
f55p 0.013 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.023 
 (0.012) (0.029) (0.018) (0.031) (0.017) 
h_edu -0.008*** 0.005 -0.013*** -0.004 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
w_edu -0.007*** -0.002 -0.010*** 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
agworker 0.007 -0.038* 0.020 -0.013 0.004 
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.014) (0.024) (0.014) 
elec -0.036*** 0.001 -0.045*** -0.028 -0.035*** 
 (0.009) (0.021) (0.013) (0.022) (0.013) 
sewage -0.021* -0.007 -0.034* -0.013 0.041*** 
 (0.012) (0.029) (0.018) (0.030) (0.016) 
healthf 0.005 -0.034 0.001 0.036 -0.003 
 (0.012) (0.028) (0.018) (0.031) (0.018) 
mobilehf 0.006 -0.059** 0.021 -0.015 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.014) (0.024) (0.015) 
mp_tom -0.004 -0.027*** -0.002 -0.025*** 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
mp_on 0.003 -0.005 0.005 0.014* -0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
mp_pot 0.012*** -0.001 0.015*** 0.004 0.009** 





Table 1.11: continued. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lpcc lpccveg lpccgrn lpccmea lpccotf 
mp_orng -0.012*** 0.008** -0.019*** 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
mp_plat -0.005 -0.013 -0.010 -0.007 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) 
mp_tort 0.009 -0.024* 0.008 -0.006 0.041*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) 
mp_corn 0.028*** 0.063*** 0.029*** 0.028* 0.035*** 
 (0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) 
mp_ndle 0.003 0.054*** -0.010 0.078*** -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.018) (0.010) (0.024) (0.011) 
mp_rice -0.011*** 0.004 -0.012** -0.031*** 0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
mp_bean 0.001 -0.002 0.008** -0.033*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
mp_chic -0.006*** -0.006* -0.005*** 0.009** -0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
mp_egg 0.001 -0.020*** 0.002 -0.018*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) 
mp_cof -0.003** -0.002 -0.006*** -0.010*** -0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Constant 6.520*** -3.836*** 6.486*** -2.441*** 5.401*** 
 (0.321) (0.788) (0.469) (0.886) (0.485) 
Observ. 8163 8657 8794 8196 8816 




























Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 





Table 1.12: 2SLS estimation of the unrestricted collective model. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lpcc lpccveg lpccgrn lpccmea lpccotf 
lpce 0.476*** 1.010*** 0.462*** 1.530*** -0.021 
 (0.087) (0.208) (0.115) (0.226) (0.135) 
lhlaby -0.004 0.016 -0.005 -0.028** 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) 
lwnonlaby 0.005** 0.016*** 0.005* -0.001 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) 
lhhsz -0.061 0.215 0.044 0.450*** -0.686*** 
 (0.066) (0.159) (0.088) (0.173) (0.103) 
ch4 0.012 -0.016 0.007 0.008 0.009 
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.010) (0.020) (0.012) 
ch510 -0.005 -0.037** -0.006 -0.030 -0.006 
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.010) (0.020) (0.012) 
m1114 0.016 -0.047* 0.023* -0.042 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.014) (0.027) (0.016) 
f1114 0.020** -0.085*** 0.027** -0.053** 0.025 
 (0.010) (0.024) (0.013) (0.026) (0.016) 
m1519 0.008 -0.074*** 0.004 -0.049* 0.014 
 (0.010) (0.024) (0.013) (0.026) (0.015) 
f1519 0.004 0.007 0.002 -0.007 -0.011 
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.013) (0.025) (0.015) 
m2034 0.027** -0.040 0.023 -0.052* 0.035** 
 (0.011) (0.026) (0.015) (0.029) (0.017) 
f2034 -0.013 -0.020 -0.019 -0.069** 0.015 
 (0.012) (0.028) (0.016) (0.030) (0.018) 
m3554 0.013 -0.076** 0.009 -0.051 0.032 
 (0.015) (0.035) (0.019) (0.038) (0.023) 
f3554 -0.001 -0.018 -0.007 -0.025 0.027 
 (0.014) (0.033) (0.018) (0.036) (0.021) 
m55p 0.011 -0.019 0.005 0.002 0.018 
 (0.016) (0.038) (0.021) (0.042) (0.025) 
f55p 0.006 -0.027 0.003 -0.032 0.028 
 (0.014) (0.034) (0.019) (0.037) (0.022) 
h_edu -0.009*** 0.007 -0.011*** -0.007 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
w_edu -0.007*** -0.001 -0.009*** 0.004 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
agworker 0.029* -0.116*** 0.045** 0.040 -0.032 
 (0.017) (0.040) (0.022) (0.044) (0.026) 
elec -0.038*** -0.014 -0.045*** -0.019 -0.034** 
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.013) (0.025) (0.015) 
sewage -0.027** 0.057* -0.046** -0.014 0.038* 
 (0.013) (0.032) (0.018) (0.035) (0.021) 
healthf 0.015 -0.063* 0.019 0.017 -0.017 
 (0.015) (0.037) (0.020) (0.040) (0.024) 
mobilehf 0.006 -0.042 0.014 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.027) (0.015) (0.029) (0.017) 
mp_tom 0.004 -0.034*** 0.006 -0.025*** 0.023*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) 
mp_on 0.005 -0.014* 0.008* 0.015* -0.013** 





Table 1.12: continued. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lpcc lpccveg lpccgrn lpccmea lpccotf 
mp_pot 0.010*** -0.005 0.012*** -0.003 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) 
mp_orng -0.010*** 0.001 -0.014*** 0.003 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
mp_plat -0.010** -0.021** -0.016*** 0.004 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) 
mp_tort 0.006 -0.033** 0.003 -0.014 0.038*** 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) 
mp_corn 0.029*** 0.061*** 0.029*** 0.020 0.025** 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) 
mp_ndle -0.001 0.073*** -0.012 0.091*** -0.019 
 (0.008) (0.020) (0.011) (0.022) (0.013) 
mp_rice -0.015*** 0.004 -0.018*** -0.020* 0.023*** 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) 
mp_bean -0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.029*** 0.009** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) 
mp_chic -0.006*** 0.001 -0.007*** 0.007* -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
mp_egg 0.004 -0.018*** 0.005 -0.015** 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) 
mp_cof -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005** -0.009** -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Constant 5.323*** -1.425 4.955*** -3.392** 6.536*** 
 (0.545) (1.303) (0.723) (1.420) (0.847) 
Observ 6311 6311 6311 6311 6311 



























Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
IVs: LPCY, TREATED, PIPES, SAMELOC, F2SHOES, FSHOES, F2SPRIM, 





Table 1.13: First stage regressions in the case of the restricted collective model. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 lpce lwnonlaby 
treated 0.049*** 4.507*** 
 (0.010) (0.021) 
lpcy 0.075*** 0.028 
 (0.009) (0.024) 
pipes 0.038*** 0.081*** 
 (0.011) (0.023) 
cement 0.137*** 0.041* 
 (0.011) (0.023) 
lhhsz -0.559*** -0.078 
 (0.044) (0.104) 
ch4 -0.020** 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.017) 
ch510 -0.007 0.024 
 (0.008) (0.019) 
m1114 0.039*** 0.129*** 
 (0.011) (0.023) 
f1114 0.026** 0.111*** 
 (0.011) (0.024) 
m1519 0.007 0.041* 
 (0.010) (0.023) 
f1519 0.008 0.040* 
 (0.010) (0.022) 
m2034 0.011 0.007 
 (0.012) (0.028) 
f2034 0.022* -0.072** 
 (0.012) (0.029) 
m3554 0.038** 0.011 
 (0.016) (0.034) 
f3554 0.014 0.002 
 (0.015) (0.033) 
m55p 0.034** 0.037 
 (0.016) (0.040) 
f55p -0.012 0.058* 
 (0.015) (0.034) 
h_edu 0.001 0.011** 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
w_edu 0.005** 0.005 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
agworker -0.072*** -0.118*** 
 (0.011) (0.028) 
elec 0.004 0.159*** 
 (0.011) (0.023) 
sewage 0.050*** 0.039 
 (0.015) (0.030) 
healthf -0.096*** 0.026 
 (0.013) (0.029) 
mobilehf 0.026** -0.069*** 
 (0.012) (0.020) 
mp_tom -0.026*** -0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) 
mp_on -0.010*** -0.023*** 




Table 1.13: continued. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 lpce lwnonlaby 
mp_pot 0.007** 0.028*** 
 (0.003) (0.007) 
mp_orng -0.011*** 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
mp_plat -0.005 -0.034*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) 
mp_tort -0.002 0.009 
 (0.006) (0.013) 
mp_corn 0.034*** 0.070*** 
 (0.007) (0.015) 
mp_ndle 0.029*** 0.081*** 
 (0.009) (0.017) 
mp_rice -0.004 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.010) 
mp_bean 0.003 0.014** 
 (0.003) (0.006) 
mp_chic 0.003** -0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
mp_egg -0.001 0.010 
 (0.003) (0.007) 
mp_cof -0.003* -0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 5.792*** 0.030 
 (0.099) (0.251) 
Observations 8947 9136 
R-squared 0.27 0.85 
F-test: IVs jointly significant 72.76 12225 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






Table 1.14: Testing the exogeneity of the treatment dummy in the unrestricted 
collective model using two samples – without young children (age 4 and below), and 
with young children (age 4 and below). 
 
Equation without young children 
c-stat 
(p-value) 
with young children 
c-stat 
(p-value) 




P.C. calorie consumption from 











P.C. calorie consumption from meat 















Table 1.15: First stage regressions in the case of the unrestricted collective model. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 lpce lhlaby lwnonlaby 
treated 0.051*** -0.324*** 4.549*** 
 (0.011) (0.040) (0.022) 
lpcy 0.072*** 1.824*** 0.013 
 (0.010) (0.045) (0.025) 
pipes 0.046*** 0.035 0.080*** 
 (0.012) (0.046) (0.024) 
sameloc -0.029*** 0.060 0.015 
 (0.010) (0.038) (0.020) 
f2shoes 0.023 -0.032 -0.018 
 (0.016) (0.057) (0.028) 
f2sprim -0.002 -0.061 -0.046* 
 (0.012) (0.047) (0.025) 
m2sprim 0.012 0.028 0.012 
 (0.014) (0.051) (0.026) 
fshoes 0.050*** -0.076 0.066** 
 (0.016) (0.057) (0.029) 
fsprim 0.031*** 0.075* 0.002 
 (0.011) (0.042) (0.021) 
hhouse 0.033** -0.062 -0.042 
 (0.013) (0.048) (0.026) 
lhhsz -0.554*** 1.770*** -0.040 
 (0.047) (0.196) (0.105) 
ch4 -0.023*** 0.057* -0.012 
 (0.008) (0.034) (0.017) 
ch510 -0.006 0.009 0.018 
 (0.009) (0.037) (0.019) 
m1114 0.038*** -0.145*** 0.113*** 
 (0.011) (0.045) (0.023) 
f1114 0.033*** -0.085* 0.104*** 
 (0.011) (0.045) (0.024) 
m1519 0.003 -0.452*** 0.032 
 (0.011) (0.049) (0.023) 
f1519 0.004 -0.181*** 0.038* 
 (0.011) (0.045) (0.023) 
m2034 0.013 -0.365*** 0.015 
 (0.013) (0.060) (0.029) 
f2034 0.020 -0.262*** -0.084*** 
 (0.013) (0.060) (0.029) 
m3554 0.040** -0.241*** 0.011 
 (0.017) (0.078) (0.036) 
f3554 0.008 -0.389*** -0.020 
 (0.016) (0.068) (0.033) 
m55p 0.040** -0.536*** 0.043 
 (0.017) (0.080) (0.042) 
f55p -0.018 -0.571*** 0.031 
 (0.016) (0.072) (0.035) 
h_edu -0.001 0.059*** 0.006 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) 
w_edu 0.004 -0.034*** 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.005) 
agworker -0.080*** 1.513*** -0.170*** 




Table 1.15: continued. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 lpce lhlaby lwnonlaby 
elec -0.010 -0.120*** 0.090*** 
 (0.012) (0.041) (0.022) 
sewage 0.045*** -0.038 0.033 
 (0.016) (0.057) (0.030) 
healthf -0.115*** 0.041 -0.011 
 (0.014) (0.054) (0.029) 
mobilehf 0.031** 0.062 -0.055*** 
 (0.012) (0.046) (0.021) 
mp_tom -0.026*** 0.032** -0.021*** 
 (0.003) (0.013) (0.007) 
mp_on -0.011*** 0.003 -0.025*** 
 (0.004) (0.017) (0.009) 
mp_pot 0.008** -0.057*** 0.027*** 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.007) 
mp_orng -0.011*** 0.014** 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) 
mp_plat -0.001 -0.023 -0.039*** 
 (0.005) (0.019) (0.008) 
mp_tort -0.012* -0.049* 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.027) (0.014) 
mp_corn 0.030*** 0.056* 0.054*** 
 (0.008) (0.030) (0.016) 
mp_ndle 0.026*** -0.047 0.052*** 
 (0.009) (0.035) (0.016) 
mp_rice -0.001 0.029 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.020) (0.010) 
mp_bean 0.003 0.031*** 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.006) 
mp_chic 0.005*** -0.014** -0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) 
mp_egg -0.002 0.017 0.016** 
 (0.003) (0.013) (0.007) 
mp_cof -0.004** -0.010 -0.008** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) 
Constant 5.845*** -6.646*** 0.254 
 (0.106) (0.441) (0.266) 
Observations 7814 7911 7981 
R-squared 0.26 0.41 0.87 
F-test: Ivs jointly significant 19.40 169.47 4616.72 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 1.16: Testing for the strict exogeneity restriction for the extended family. 
 
 (1) clpcc (2) clpcc 
clpce 0.454*** 0.455*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
cnearners -0.015***  
 (0.004)  
chhsz 0.006 0.006 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
lpce -0.002 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
nearners -0.013***  
 (0.004)  
cch4 0.055*** 0.053*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
cch510 0.045*** 0.044*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
cm1114 0.040*** 0.039*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
cf1114 0.055*** 0.054*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
cm1519 0.047*** 0.046*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
cf1519 0.042*** 0.041*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
cm2034 0.019* 0.021** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
cf2034 0.011 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
cm3554 0.045*** 0.049*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
cf3554 0.014 0.013 
 (0.017) (0.017) 
cm55p 0.015 0.020 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
cf55p 0.017 0.015 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
Nfenter  0.033*** 
  (0.010) 
Nfdrop  0.034*** 
  (0.011) 
Nmdrop  0.013 
  (0.008) 
Nmenter  -0.018** 
  (0.008) 
nmearners  -0.023*** 
  (0.005) 
nfearners  -0.011* 
  (0.006) 
Constant 0.024 0.047 
 (0.034) (0.035) 
Observations 35489 35489 
R-squared 0.18 0.18 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;  




Table 1.17: First stage regression for the estimation of the first-difference model. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 cnearners Nmenter Nfenter Nmdrop Nfdrop 
lpcy 0.355*** 0.111*** 0.020*** -0.155*** -0.008*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
m1519 0.018** 0.096*** -0.002 0.080*** 0.017*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
f1519 0.014* 0.020*** 0.045*** 0.006* 0.045*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
treated  -0.027*** 0.058*** 0.047*** -0.040*** 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
m2034  0.041*** -0.020*** 0.049*** -0.006** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
f2034  0.015*** 0.026*** -0.031*** 0.028*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
chhsz 0.034** -0.007 0.013* -0.019*** -0.003 
 (0.016) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
cch4 -0.017 -0.015** 0.024*** 0.011** 0.008* 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
cch510 -0.036*** -0.019*** -0.002 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
cm1114 -0.027 -0.001 -0.011* 0.009 -0.001 
 (0.018) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
cf1114 -0.047*** -0.011 -0.002 0.005 0.022*** 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
cm1519 -0.002 -0.027*** 0.005 -0.013** -0.006 
 (0.018) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
cf1519 -0.031** -0.011 -0.003 0.009 -0.003 
 (0.016) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
cm2034 -0.015 -0.005 0.008 0.014** 0.006 
 (0.016) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
cf2034 -0.007 -0.014 0.007 0.011* 0.001 
 (0.018) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
cm3554 -0.054** 0.011 -0.033*** 0.043*** -0.011 
 (0.023) (0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
cf3554 0.004 0.003 0.007 -0.012 0.007 
 (0.025) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) 
cm55p -0.078*** 0.023 -0.050*** 0.051*** 0.002 
 (0.029) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) 
cf55p -0.008 -0.024 0.021* 0.011 0.003 
 (0.029) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) 
Constant -1.687*** -0.409*** -0.017 0.885*** 0.103*** 
 (0.032) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) 
Observ. 34556 34556 34556 34556 34556 
R-squared 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.14 0.02 
F-test: IVs jointly significant 1209.21 437.23 80.82 605.15 128.04 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 1.18: Estimation of the first-difference model in the case of the extended 
family.  
 
 (1) (2) 
cnearners -0.091***  
 (0.011)  
Nfenter  0.198** 
  (0.080) 
Nfdrop  -0.154* 
  (0.092) 
Nmenter  -0.102*** 
  (0.035) 
Nmdrop  0.178*** 
  (0.030) 
clpce 0.466*** 0.460*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
chhsz 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
cch4 0.060*** 0.052*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
cch510 0.046*** 0.049*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
cm1114 0.035*** 0.039*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
cf1114 0.048*** 0.055*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
cm1519 0.051*** 0.047*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
cf1519 0.041*** 0.039*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) 
cm2034 0.021* 0.017 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
cf2034 0.005 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
cm3554 0.046*** 0.049*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) 
cf3554 0.001 0.001 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
cm55p 0.014 0.025 
 (0.021) (0.022) 
cf55p -0.004 -0.013 
 (0.021) (0.021) 
Constant 0.004 -0.032** 
 (0.004) (0.015) 
Observations 32065 32065 
 
 
Note: Instruments in the first column (equation 2.3 in the text) are LPCY, M1519 and 
F1519. Instruments in the second column (equation 2.4 in the text) are LPCY, 
TREATED, M2034, F2034, M1519 and F1519. 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table 1.18: continued. 
  
 (1) (2) 
Test Nfdrop=-Nfenter  0.14 
(0.71) 
Test Nmdrop=-Nmenter  1.85 
(0.17) 
Test Nfdrop=Nmdrop  9.78 
(0.02) 
Test Nfenter=Nmenter  11 
(0.0009) 




Test of OIR for lpcy 0.86 
(0.35) 
 






Table 1.19: Testing the unitary model restriction based on the restricted collective 
model and the unrestricted collective model. 
 






































Meat and meat 
products 
calories 
Cereals and grains calories 4.20 
(0.04) 
_ _ 


















Appendix 2: Tables of results and figures for chapter 2 
Table 2.1: Impacts on wealth and nutrition along program targeting criteria 


























0 1 2 3: 0.H β β β= = =  
p-value 


























0 1 2 3: 0.H β β β= = =  
p-value 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 

























0 1 2 3: 0.H β β β= = =  
p-value 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 

























0 1 2 3: 0.H β β β= = =  
p-value 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 





Table 2.2: Fraction with a positive program impact on wealth and nutrition using 
treatment effects on subgroups defined by the targeting criteria 
 
 Systematic impacts 
standard deviation 
(S.E.)* 
Ho: any program 
impact 
p-value 




P.C. Consumption 16.16 
(0.06) 
0.0001 0.81 














P.C. Consumption 10.82 
(0.07) 
0.0001 0.992 














P.C. Consumption 13.44 
(0.07) 
0.0001 0.96 



































Fraction with a positive 
program impact 
Ho: any impact 
p-value 
 
0 1 2 3: 0.H β β β= = = p
-value 
Primary school age boys 




























































Secondary school age boys 




























































*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust standard error in parentheses. In the participation equations, coefficients reported 
measure change in the probability of participating. 


















Fraction with a positive 
program impact 
Ho: any impact 
p-value 
 
0 1 2 3: 0.H β β β= = = p
-value 
Primary school age girls 




























































Secondary school age girls 




























































*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. Robust standard error in parentheses. In the participation equations,  
coefficients reported measure change in the probability of participating. 
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Table 2.5: Bounds on the standard deviation of total impacts using the Fréchet-
Hoeffding Inequalities 
 


























































































Note: *** 1% significance level, Bootstrap S.E. in parentheses (500 replications). Results 
obtained using the percentiles of the two empirical c.d.f.s.  
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Table 2.6: Bounds of the unobserved part of the standard deviation of impacts using 
the Fréchet-Hoeffding Inequalities 
 














































































* Standard Errors for the systematic standard deviation are obtained from the boootstrap with 500 
replications. 
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Table 2.7: Standard Deviation of Total Impacts from the QTE estimation 
 
 Ho: impact is constant 
across deciles of the 
untreated distribution 
p-value 




P.C. Consumption 0.2665 3.34 
(.04) 
P.C. Expenditures 0.5834 2.14 
(.03) 
P.C. Food Consumption 0.1355 3.10 
(.03) 
P.C. Food Expenditures 0.7935 1.65 
(.03) 
June 1999 
P.C. Consumption 0.0001 2.83 
(.03) 
P.C. Expenditures 0.0002 1.90 
(.03) 
P.C. Food Consumption 0.0001 2.91 
(.04) 
P.C. Food Expenditures 0.0001 1.46 
(.02) 
November 1999 
P.C. Consumption 0.0049 3.04 
(.04) 
P.C. Expenditures 0.0216 2.06 
(.03) 
P.C. Food Consumption 0.0001 3.23 
(.03) 
P.C. Food Expenditures 0.0051 1.65 
(.02) 
 
The dependent variable is the residual from the OLS regression of the outcome on a set of 
covariates X that includes household size, household composition and characteristics of 
the head of household. 
Standard Errors are obtained from the bootstrap with 200 replications. 
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Table 2.8: Systematic and unobserved heterogeneity in impacts from the QTE 
estimation 
 






Ho: no unobserved 
heterogeneity in 
impacts - p-value 
November 1998 































































The dependent variable is the residual from the OLS regression of the outcome on a set of 
covariates X that includes household size, household composition and characteristics of 
the head of household. 
Standard Errors are obtained from the bootstrap with 200 replications. 
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Table 2.9: Testing the presence of heteroscedasticity from the Hildreth-Houck 
Random Coefficient Model for Household-level Outcome Variables under the 
strong independence assumption. 
 
In the estimation results below, the only random coefficient is ,   is the treatment dummy
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Household value of food 


















Note: *** indicates 1% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level. 




Table 2.10: Heterogeneity in impacts from the Hildreth-Houck Random Coefficient 





In the model below, the only random coefficient is ,   is the treatment dummy,




y T Z T Z X
β
α β γ β δ ε= + + + × + +
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† Percentage with a positive impact is derived assuming a normal distribution. 
† S.E. are computed from the bootstrap. 
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Figure 1: Types of households based on their indirect utility levels 
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Figure 2: Difference in per capita value of consumption in the treatment and control group in November 






















Figure 3: Difference in per capita value of consumption in treatment and control in June 1999 




















Figure 4: Difference in per capita value of consumption in treatment and control group in November 1999 


















Figure 5: Differences in per capita value of food consumption in treatment and control groups in 






















Figure 6: Difference in per capita value of food consumption in treatment and control groups in June 
1999 





















Figure 7: Difference in per capita of food consumption in treatment and control groups in November 1999 




















Figure 8: Unobserved difference in per capita value of consumption in the treatment and control group in 






















Figure 9: Unobserved difference in per capita value of consumption in treatment and control in June 1999 




















Figure 10: Unobserved difference in per capita value of consumption in treatment and control group in 

















Figure 11: Unobserved differences in per capita value of food consumption in treatment and control 






















Figure 12: Unobserved difference in per capita value of food consumption in treatment and control 



















Figure 13: Unobserved difference in per capita of food consumption in treatment and control groups in 
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Figure 16: Distribution of impacts on November 1998 household consumption – 
Gamma distribution. 
 













Figure 17: Distribution of impacts on November 1999 household consumption – 
Type IV Pearson distribution. 
 






On the x-axis are program impacts in pesos, and on the y-axis the associated frequencies. 
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Figure 18: Distribution of impacts on June 1999 food expenditures – Gamma 
distribution. 
 














Figure 19: Distribution of impacts on November 1999 food consumption – Gamma 
distribution. 
 











Appendix 3: Data appendix of chapter 2 
In most of the study, we use the household-level datasets respectively collected in 
November 1998, June 1999 and November 1999. We restrict the sample to only include 
households who are eligible to PROGRESA benefits. The breakdown of the data by 
round is as follow: 
Table 3.1: Number of households by round 
 
 Number of Households 
November 1998 18,066 
June 1999 17,230 
November 1999 16,761 
Total 52,057 
 
The program evaluation sample is based on a random allocation of villages into 
treatment and control groups. The numbers of PROGRESA eligible households in 
treatment and control groups are given in the following table: 
Table 3.2: Number of households by experimental groups 
 
 Number of household 
Treatment group  31,910 
Control group 20,147 
 
In the section 4, we analyze the heterogeneity of impacts on wealth and nutrition 
along the program targeting criteria. The two program targeting criteria are found in the 
October 1997 baseline dataset. Thus, we merge the November 1998, June 1999 and 
November 1999 data with the October 1997 data. The following table shows that the 
resulting sample has 50,206 households: 
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Table 3.3: Number of household in the wealth and nutrition sample of section 4 
 
 Number of households 
Resulting sample 50,206 
October 1997 only 6,546 
Nov. 98-June 99-Nov. 99 only 1,851 
 
In this resulting sample used in section 4, the breakdowns of the data by round 
and the breakdown of the data by treatment/control group are given in the following 
tables: 
Table 3.4: The wealth and nutrition sample of section 4 by round 
 
 Number of Households 
November 1998 17,044 
June 1999 16,526 
November 1999 16,636 
Total 50,206 
 
Table 3.5: The wealth and nutrition sample of section 4 by experimental groups 
 
 Number of household 
Treatment group  30,764 
Control group 19,442 
 
In addition, in section 4, we analyze the heterogeneity of impacts along the 
program targeting criteria for children’s time allocation. We use a detailed individual-
level time allocation module collected in June 1999, that we supplement with the October 
1997 data on the targeting indices. In the following table, we show the number of 




Table 3.6: The time allocation sample of section 4 by experimental groups 
 
 Number of children 
Treatment group 18,628 
Control group 11,621 
Total 30,249 
 
In the remaining of the data appendix section, we present descriptive statistics for 
the variables used in the different analyses.  
Table 3.7: Descriptive statistics for the wealth and nutrition sample of section 4 
 
Variable Number of observations Mean S.D. 
P.C. Value of consumption 47576 193.98 142.07 
P.C. Expenditures 47573 155.54 119.18 
P.C. Value of food consumed 47580 147.35 109.45 
P.C. Food expenditures 47588 109.21 81.67 
Treatment indicator 48852 0.61 0.49 
Household size 48852 5.94 2.83 
# children less than 2 yrs old 48852 0.52 0.79 
# of children 3-5 48852 0.56 0.74 
# of children 5-10 48852 1.13 1.15 
# of boys 11-14 48852 0.35 0.59 
# of girls 11-14 48852 0.33 0.58 
# of boys 15-19 48852 0.34 0.62 
# of girls 15-19 48852 0.33 0.60 
# of men 20-34 48852 0.50 0.63 
# of women 20-34 48852 0.56 0.61 
# of men 35-54 48852 0.45 0.51 
# of women 35-54 48852 0.45 0.52 
# of men 55 and more 48852 0.27 0.46 
# of women 55 and more 48852 0.27 0.47 
= 1 if the head of household is an ag-worker 45134 2.11 2.13 
=1 if the head of household is a male 48843 0.89 0.31 
# years of schooling for the head 48852 2.67 2.68 
Head speaks indigenous language 48852 0.38 0.49 
Age of head of household 48726 46.71 15.97 
 
Table 3.8: Poverty score and village marginality score for the wealth and nutrition 
sample of section 4 
 
Variable  Number of 
observations 
Mean Median 25th percentile 75th percentile 
Poverty score 48733 -696 -767 -698 -622 




Table 3.9: Descriptive statistics for the time allocation sample if section 4 
 
Variable Number of 
observations 
Mean S.D. 
=1 if boy 30249 0.51 0.49992 
=1 if participates to school 30249 0.43 0.495135 
=1 if works in the labor market 30249 0.13 0.336259 
=1 if works at home 30249 0.42 0.493271 
Hours spent studying 30249 157 193 
Hours spent working outside the home 30249 50 147 
Hours spent working in the home 30249 65 125 
=1 if 8 yrs old 30249 0.10 0.30 
=1 if 9 yrs old 30249 0.10 0.30 
=1 if 10 yrs old 30249 0.09 0.29 
=1 if 11 yrs old 30249 0.10 0.30 
=1 if 12 yrs old 30249 0.10 0.30 
=1 if 13 yrs old 30249 0.10 0.29 
=1 if 14 yrs old 30249 0.09 0.29 
=1 if 15 yrs old 30249 0.09 0.28 
=1 if 16 yrs old 30249 0.09 0.28 
=1 if 17 yrs old 30249 0.07 0.26 
=1 if 18 yrs old 30249 0.07 0.25 
# of children below age 4 30249 0.99 1.13 
# of children 5-10 30249 1.68 1.19 
# of boys 11-14 30249 0.69 0.75 
# of girls 11-14 30249 0.66 0.74 
# of boys 15-19 30249 0.66 0.78 
# of girls 15-19 30249 0.62 0.77 
# of men 20-34 30249 0.45 0.66 
# of women 20-34 30249 0.52 0.63 
# of men 35-54 30249 0.66 0.49 
# of women 35-54 30249 0.67 0.50 
# of men 55 and more 30249 0.21 0.42 
# of women 55 and more 30249 0.17 0.39 
# of yrs of schooling for the head of household 29879 2.56 2.46 
# of yrs of schooling for the spouse 30247 2.51 2.54 
=1 if the head is a men 29879 0.93 0.26 
Age of the head 30245 45.7 11.5 
Age of the spouse 30245 39.1 11.2 
=1 if head speaks an indigenous language 30249 0.38 0.49 
 
 
Table 3.10: Poverty score and village marginality score for the time allocation 
sample of section 4 
 
Variable  Number of 
observations 
Mean Median 25th percentile 75th percentile 
Poverty score 30174 -662 -739 -667 -587 





Table 3.11: Descriptive statistics for the sample used in all sections but section 4 
 
 Number of observations Mean S.D. 
P.C. Value of consumption 50577 195 143 
P.C. Expenditures 50574 156 120 
P.C. Value of food consumed 50576 148 110 
P.C. Food expenditures 50580 110 83 
Value of consumption 51017 982 546 
Expenditures 51017 775 435 
Value of food consumed 51023 745 418 
Food expenditures 51025 541 297 
Treatment indicator 52057 0.61 0.49 






Appendix 4: Deriving moments of a distribution from deconvolution 
Let X and Y be two independent random variables and let Z be the convolution of 
X and Y. Suppose the first four moments of Z and Y are known. The objective is to derive 
the first four moments of X as a function of the first four moments of Z and Y. 
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